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DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE MURDER IN
THE CONTEXT OF DWI HOMICIDES
IN NEW YORK
RYAN J. MAHONEY'

INTRODUCTION

On a cloudy, drizzly summer night in 2006, Martin Heidgen
met a friend for drinks after work. Later in the evening, he
attended a party where he continued to drink. By two o'clock in
the morning he had become highly intoxicated. He left the party
and proceeded to drive home. During the trip, he drove his car
onto a divided parkway heading in the wrong direction towards
oncoming traffic. He struck a limousine head on, killing the fiftynine-year-old driver and a seven-year-old girl. He was convicted
of second-degree murder.
"Thou shalt not kill."' One of the most fundamental and
intuitive maxims of human law and morality is the prohibition of
murder. The killing of another person has long been regarded as
a lurid and intolerable wrong against society. Laws prohibiting
murder have existed for thousands of years and have evolved
considerably as society and the legal system have become more
advanced. The modern understanding of the word murder is
complex. Even more complex is the law that applies to homicide
generally. The law of homicide is a law of degrees, hinging on
delicate issues of circumstance, human action, culpability,
causation, mental state, emotion, risk, and semantics. This
complexity can be a valuable tool for dealing with the infinite
number of variables present in the real world: The ability to
account for subtle differences and to administer punishment that
is custom fitted to the crime committed is an ideal way to achieve
fairness and promote justice. Unfortunately, this complexity can

t Articles Editor, St. John's Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2009, St. John's
University School of Law; B.A., 2006, Boston College.
' Exodus 20:13.
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also cause confusion, resulting in a misapplication of the law and
undermining the very purpose these statutes were meant to
achieve.
At common law, murder was defined simply as "unlawful
homicide done with 'malice aforethought.' ",2 The term malice
aforethought encompassed, among other things, killings
committed with "extremely reckless indifference to the value of
3
human life (the so-called abandoned and malignant heart)."
This brand of murder applied to actions that carried a high
likelihood of death without being aimed at anyone in particular,
but were perpetrated with a full awareness of the probable
consequences. 4 Such killings were considered as culpable as
intentional murder.5 This designation remains in New York's
murder statute today, which includes as second-degree murder a
reckless killing committed "[u]nder circumstances evincing a
depraved indifference to human life."6
The depraved indifference murder statute in New York has
remained unchanged since 1967, but cases applying this doctrine
have caused considerable confusion and resulted in an ongoing
debate among judges and others in the legal community. The
application of this statute in New York courts has evolved
significantly over the last several years.
These recent
developments have been made in an effort to alleviate the
confusion, but have left the courts divided and caused many to
question whether this doctrine is being applied as the legislature
originally intended.
In severe cases, state prosecutors have sought murder
convictions under New York's depraved indifference murder
statute for drunk driving fatalities.'
Families of victims and
staunch opponents of drunk driving maintain that these
convictions are justified: They see murder convictions as a step

2 United States v. Wharton, 433 F.2d 451, 454 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (quoting Fisher
v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 472 (1946)).
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 977 (8th ed. 2004).
' Darry v. People, 10 N.Y. 120, 148 (1854), superseded by statute, N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 125.25(2) (McKinney 2008), as recognized in People v. Sanchez, 98 N.Y.2d
373, 383-84, 777 N.E.2d 204, 210, 748 N.Y.S.2d 312, 318 (2002), overruled on other
grounds by People v. Feingold, 7 N.Y.3d 288, 294, 852 N.E.2d 1163, 1167, 819
N.Y.S.2d 691, 695 (2006).
5 Sanchez, 98 N.Y.2d at 382, 777 N.E.2d at 209, 748 N.Y.S.2d at 317.
6

N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(2).

' See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
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in the right direction towards greater deterrence and increased
punishment for driving while intoxicated ("DWI") offenses.8
Although one purpose of New York homicide law is surely to
punish deaths caused by drunk driving, the administration of
this punishment cannot extend beyond the framework of the New
York Penal Law ("NYPL"). It is the position of this Note that the
overwhelming majority of DWI homicides fail to rise to the level
of a depraved indifference to human life, and that to seek a
murder conviction in these cases is an overextension and
misapplication of New York homicide law.
This Note will proceed in four parts. Part I will give a brief
overview of the culpable mental states and homicide crimes in
the NYPL in order to explain the various offenses and their
relation to one another in terms of conduct, culpability, and
punishment.
Part II will give a brief history of depraved
indifference murder in New York, focusing on the recent
developments of the past several years that serve as the doctrinal
blueprint for depraved indifference today. Part III will discuss
why depraved indifference murder cannot apply to most DWI
homicides and address the theoretical problems that arise when
prosecutors seek murder convictions in these types of cases. To
illustrate these points, Part III will focus on the highly publicized
and controversial murder conviction of Martin Heidgen. Part IV
will propose a course of action for dealing with DWI homicides
that takes into account the theoretical problems and concerns
discussed in Part III.
I.
A.

NYPL HOMICIDE LAW-AN EXERCISE IN PROPORTIONALITY
Theoretical Origins

"All men agree that in general it is desirable to prevent
homicide and bodily injury. ' Unfortunately, the means used to
achieve this end are not the subject of such unanimity. The
philosophical, ethical, political and legal issues surrounding a
unified theory of punishment have been debated for hundreds of
I Throughout this Note, the term DWI will refer specifically to driving under the
influence of alcohol, but the concepts discussed can be expanded to include driving
under the influence of drugs or driving under the influence of a combination of drugs
and alcohol.
9 Herbert Wechsler & Jerome Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide: 1, 37
COLUM. L. REV. 701, 702 (1937).
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years and will continue to be debated. 10
"The dominant
approaches... are retributive and utilitarian."1"
There are
aspects of each theory that are desirable1 2 and, for this reason,
modern penal codes in the United States have become an
admixture of both. 3 The end product is a unified system of
criminal punishment with the ultimate goal of achieving justice.
Depraved indifference murder is just one gear in the welloiled machine of New York homicide law.
Article 125 of
the NYPL defines over a dozen individual homicide offenses. 4 It
is a law of degrees: The subtle distinctions between offenses
are the primary vehicle by which the legislature can
"differentiate... between
serious
and
minor
offenses
5
and... prescribe proportionate penalties therefor." From both
a retributive and utilitarian standpoint, proportionality in
punishment is of paramount importance. From a utilitarian
standpoint, punishment "ought only to be admitted in as far as it
promises to exclude some greater evil."'6 Analogously, from a
retributive standpoint, "punishment should be in proportion
to... moral desert." 7 Because New York law is influenced by
both theories, proportionality is a fundamental concern in our
modern system of criminal punishment.
Typically, "the severity of criminal punishments is to some
degree determined by the extent of the harm caused."18 This
holds true for article 125, even though all of the offenses in that

"0See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 20 (4th ed. 2006); see
also Guyora Binder, Punishment Theory: Moral or Political?, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.
321, 321 (2002).
" Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE
1281, 1284 (Joshua Dressler ed., 2d ed. 2002); see also PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL
LAW: CASE STUDIES & CONTROVERSIES 83 (2005) ("Traditionally, two sorts of

justifications for imposing punishment are given: utilitarian and retributivist.").
12 DRESSLER, supra note 10, at 23.
is Id.; see also Herbert Wechsler & Jerome Michael, A Rationale of the Law of
Homicide: 11, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 1261, 1263 (1937) ("There is room for much
diversity within a system but, if it is to win respect, it must fit together somehow as
an ethical whole.").
14 N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 125.00-125.60 (McKinney 2008).
1s Id. § 1.05(4).
16 JEREMY BENTHAM,

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND

LEGISLATION 158 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1996).
17 DRESSLER, supra note 10, at 24.

18 Antony Duff, Theories of Criminal Law, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY, Apr. 14, 2008 [hereinafter Theories], http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/
criminal-law.
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article describe "conduct which causes the death of a person. " 19
Thus, while a consideration of the harm may be essential in
assessing the severity of offenses and proportionality of
punishment between different offenses generally, all offenses
within article 125 concern the same harm and are on an equal
playing field in this respect.
After harm, the severity of
punishment also typically depends on "the nature and degree of
the offender's culpability for that harm."" The term culpability
refers to how deserving of blame a person is-the wrongness, or
evilness of a person's actions.2 1 Obviously, greater culpability
warrants greater punishment, especially between offenses where
the harm is the same.
B.

Article 15-CulpableMental States

Each homicide offense contains two elements: (1) conduct
that causes the death of another person and (2) the mental state
(mens rea) of the offender.2 2 It is the mental state of the offender
that addresses this question of culpability. The NYPL contains
four different culpable mental states: criminal negligence,
recklessness, knowledge, and intent-listed in order of increasing
culpability.2 3 Of these four, recklessness and intent are most
pertinent to a discussion of depraved indifference murder.
Recklessness requires an awareness and conscious disregard
of a "substantial and unjustifiable risk.... The risk must be of
such nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross
deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person
would observe in the situation."2 4 A person acts intentionally
when his "conscious objective" is to achieve a specific result or to
engage in some type of conduct. 25 This follows intuitively from
the plain English definition of the word. It is purposeful,

19 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.00. There are several offenses in article 125 dealing
with abortion. Id. This Note will avoid the discussion of unborn children and
abortion offenses completely, omitting sections 125.40-125.60 from the discussion of
article 125.
20 Theories, supra note 18.
21

AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 442 (4th ed.

2006).
22

6 RICHARD A. GREENBERG ET AL., N.Y. PRACTICE SERIES, N.Y. CRIMINAL LAW

§ 6:1 (3d ed. 2007).
23 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05(1)-(4).
24 Id. § 15.05(3).
25 Id. § 15.05(1).
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deliberate action.
The "conscious objective" element of
intentional crimes differentiates them from reckless crimes.
One who acts intentionally.., with the conscious objective of
bringing about [a] result cannot at the same time act
recklessly-that is, with conscious disregard of a substantial
and unjustifiable risk that such a result will occur. The act is
either intended or not intended; it cannot simultaneously be
both.2 6
There are two additional provisions of article 15 that are
especially germane to a discussion of DWI homicides. The first is
section 15.25. This section explains that intoxication may not
serve as a complete defense to a crime, but that "evidence of
intoxication... may be offered.., whenever it is relevant to
negative an element of the crime charged."27 This passage is
crucial, because it allows evidence of intoxication to be used when
assessing the mens rea of an offender. 2 Recklessness, however,
is the exception: "A person who creates.., a risk but is unaware
thereof solely by reason of voluntary intoxication... acts
recklessly with respect thereto."2 9 This assertion reflects the
legislature's unwillingness to allow voluntary intoxication to
exculpate a person from criminal liability for crimes involving
recklessness .30
C. Article 125-Gradingof New York Homicide Offenses
The NYPL does not explicitly say in article 15 which
culpable mental state is most or least culpable.
This
determination is implicitly stated in the grading of offenses.
Culpability is determined largely by the culpable mental state
required for the offense and, to a smaller degree, the attendant
circumstances surrounding the crime.31 The specific homicide
offenses are set forth in article 125 of the NYPL. Within this
26 People v. Gallagher, 69 N.Y.2d 525, 529, 508 N.E.2d 909, 910, 516 N.Y.S.2d
174, 175 (1987) (internal citations omitted).
27 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.25.
28 GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 22, § 1:11 ("Evidence of intoxication may... be
offered to negate a culpable mental state .....
29 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05(3).
20 The theoretical justification for this is that "the element of recklessness
itself... encompasses the risks created by [a] defendant's conduct in getting drunk."
People v. Register, 60 N.Y.2d 270, 280, 457 N.E.2d 704, 709, 469 N.Y.S.2d 599, 604
(1983), overruled by People v. Feingold, 7 N.Y.3d 288, 294, 852 N.E.2d 1163, 1167,
819 N.Y.S.2d 691, 695 (2006).
31 See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
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article, there are five different grades of offenses ranging from AI felonies-the highest grade offense in the NYPL-to E
felonies-the lowest grade of felony in the NYPL1 2 Higher grade
crimes indicate higher culpability, which in turn justify greater
punishment. For homicide crimes, greater punishment means
longer sentences. Sentences are imposed by judges based on the
facts of a case and the grade of the offense. For each grade
offense, the sentencing guidelines of article 70 prescribe a range
of possible sentences. Even within a specific grade, sentences
may vary between offenses to reflect more subtle differences in
culpability.3 3 The final product is a unified system of law that
defines, classifies, and punishes different homicide offenses in a
way that is commensurate with the conduct of the offender.
Appendix A organizes the offenses of article 125 and the
sentencing provisions of article 70 into table format. The table
displays all of the homicide offenses at a glance and shows how
each offense is defined, graded, and punished in relation to the
others-a working diorama of proportionality. The table contains
each homicide offense, the grade of the offense, whether it is
considered a violent felony, and the authorized minimum and
maximum sentence for the offense per article 70. A short
explanation of the conduct required for each offense is also given.
The important thing to note about this column is that the
distinction between "intentional" and "unintentional" does not
refer to the mental state required for the offense. Rather, it
refers to whether the killing itself is intentional. 4 For example,
a person who acts intentionally to cause serious physical injury
may be acting with intent, but not with an intent to kill.
II.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE MURDER IN
NEW YORK
The current scheme of New York homicide law is a thorough,
accurate, and just means of classifying and punishing homicide
offenses.
Due to
the complexity
of the
offenses
and the subtle differences between them, this scheme must
be strictly applied if it is to function as intended.
A
32

N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.00-125.60.

11 See infra app. A.
31 "Of primary importance in determining the character of the actor is the
distinction between behavior which is advertently homicidal and that which is only
inadvertently so." Wechsler & Michael, supra note 13, at 1274.
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misinterpretation of an offense can result in a misapplication of
law that will throw the whole system off balance, resulting in an
unfair and disproportionate administration of punishment.
Thus, the depraved indifference murder statute and the cases
interpreting it must be approached with caution.
A.

Depraved Indifference Murder Pre-Register

The concept of depraved indifference murder is rooted in the
common law definition of malice aforethought. 5
The term
encompasses "(1)the intent to kill, (2)the intent to inflict
grievous bodily harm, (3) extremely reckless indifference to the
value of human life (the so-called abandoned and malignant
heart), or (4) the intent to commit a dangerous felony (which
leads to culpability under the felony-murder rule)."36
The
inclusion of depraved indifference or "depraved heart" murder in
this formulation occurred in England in the middle of the
eighteenth century, and made its way to United States courts
shortly thereafter.3 ' The doctrine was explicitly incorporated into
New York law under the Revised Statutes of 1829.3 Under these
statutes, murder was defined as a killing "perpetrated by any act
imminently dangerous to others, and evincing a depraved mind,
regardless of human life, although without any premeditated
design to effect the death of any particular individual."3 9
The leading case applying this statute was Darry v. People.4"
In this case, the defendant killed his wife by beating her over a
period of several days. Judge Selden, writing "the authoritative
opinion" for the court,'4 held that "depraved mind" was a mental
state and prohibited the offense from being applied in one-on-one
situations such as Darry's. 4" He explained that the statute was
meant to apply to cases "where the acts resulting in death are
31 United States v. Wharton, 433 F.2d 451, 454 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
36 BLAcK'S LAW DICTIONARY 977 (8th ed. 2004).
17 Abraham Abramovsky & Jonathan I. Edelstein,

Depraved Indifference
Murder Prosecutions in New York: Time for Substantive and Procedural
Clarification,55 SYRACUSE L. REV. 455, 460-61 (2005).
31 Id. at 462. These statutes included the state's first penal code. Id.
"9 2 N.Y. Rev. Stat. pt. 4, ch. 1, tit. 1, § 5(2) (1829).
40 10 N.Y. 120, 148 (1854), superseded by statute, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(2)

(McKinney 2008), as recognized in People v. Sanchez, 98 N.Y.2d 373, 383-84, 777
N.E.2d 204, 210, 748 N.Y.S.2d 312, 318 (2002), overruled on other grounds by People
v. Feingold, 7 N.Y.3d 288, 294, 852 N.E.2d 1163, 1167, 819 N.Y.S.2d 691, 695 (2006).
4' Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 37, at 462.
42 See Darry, 10 N.Y. at 147-48.
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calculated to put the lives of many persons in jeopardy without
being aimed at any one in particular, and are perpetrated with a
full consciousness of the probable consequences." 43 The opinion
was the first in New York to use the word "recklessness,"'
describing the mental state as an extreme form of recklessness
exhibiting "utter wantonness," 4 "malicious intent,"4 6 and
"indifference to human life."47 Judge Selden equated the offense
in terms of culpability to intent, stating that depraved killings
are "fully equivalent to a direct design to destroy [life] ."4
In 1967, over a century after Darry was decided, a new penal
law was adopted in New York. The new section on depraved
indifference murder, which was identical to the current statute,
stated that a person is guilty of murder when, "[ulnder
circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, he
recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death
to another person, and thereby causes the death of another
person.'49 This language differed slightly from the 1829 version,
but the 1964 Revision Commission advised that it was to be
"substantially a restatement of the former provision."" This new
language was put to the test in People v. Poplis, 1 where in facts
similar to Darry, the defendant caused the death of a child by
beating him repeatedly over the course of six days. 2 Despite the
nearly identical facts and a new statute which was intended to
operate as a restatement of the old, the court came to a different
result. The court stated that "[tihe actual decision in Darry
turned on a limitation in the language of that statute which,
seeming to require a threat of danger to more than one person,
was subsequently corrected by amendment." 53 The language

" Id. at 148.
Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 37, at 462.

4

45 Darry, 10 N.Y. at 138.
4

Id. at 137.
at 148.

47 Id.
48

Id.

49 N.Y. PENAL LAW

§ 125.25(2) (McKinney 2008).
o People v. Register, 60 N.Y.2d 270, 281, 457 N.E.2d 704, 709, 469 N.Y.S.2d
599, 604 (1983) (Jasen, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted) (calling
this fact a "crucial piece of legislative history"), overruled on other grounds by People
v. Feingold, 7 N.Y.3d 288, 294, 852 N.E.2d 1163, 1167, 819 N.Y.S.2d 691, 695 (2006).
51 30 N.Y.2d 85, 281 N.E.2d 167, 330 N.Y.S.2d 365 (1972).
52 Id. at 87, 281 N.E.2d at 167, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 366.
5
Id. at 89, 281 N.E.2d at 168, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 367.
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changed from "any act imminently dangerous to others,"54 to
"conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person.
Although it appeared that Judge Selden's decision in Darry
"turned on deeper considerations than the use of a plural noun,"
the Poplis court did away with the danger-to-many requirement
of Darry.5 6 Nevertheless, Poplis continued to define depraved
indifference as a mental state above and beyond traditional
recklessness and stated that murder "requires more than
recklessly causing death .... The murder definition requires
conduct with 'depraved indifference' to 'human life,' plus
This is conduct of graver culpability, and it
recklessness.
mere recklessness
than
serious
is... something more
alone .... ""
B.

Register and the Dissenters

The Poplis formulation was the state of the law at the time
of the Court of Appeals' seminal decision of People v. Register51 in
1983. The defendant, Bruce Register, was drinking with a friend
in a "packed" barroom in Rochester, New York when an
argument broke out.5 9 Register fired two shots from his pistol,
The forty or fifty people in the bar
injuring two people.
scrambled for the doors, and some tried to remove the injured
men. During the commotion, Marvin Lindsey, who was "a friend
or acquaintance" of Register, walked by.60 For no apparent
reason, Register turned and fired again, killing Lindsey." The
jury acquitted Register of intentional murder but convicted him
of depraved indifference murder.62 On appeal, Register argued
that his intoxication prevented him from becoming aware of and
thus depravedly indifferent to, the risk associated with his
conduct. 3

" 2 N.Y. Rev. Stat. pt. 4, ch. 1, tit. 1, § 5(2) (1829) (emphasis added).
5 N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.25(2) (McKinney 2008) (emphasis added).
56 See Bernard E. Gegan, A Case of Depraved Mind Murder, 49 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 417, 436 (1974).
5, Poplis, 30 N.Y.2d at 88, 281 N.E.2d at 168, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 366.
60 N.Y.2d 270, 457 N.E.2d 704, 469 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1983), overruled by People
v. Feingold, 7 N.Y.3d 288, 852 N.E.2d 1163, 819 N.Y.S.2d 691 (2006).
11 See id. at 273-75, 457 N.E.2d at 705-06, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 600-01.
60 Id. at 273, 457 N.E.2d at 705, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 600.
61 Id. at 274, 457 N.E.2d at 705, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 600.
62 Id.
See id. at 275, 457 N.E.2d at 706, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 601.
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The court held, in a 4-3 opinion, that the mens rea required
for depraved indifference murder was simply recklessness,6 4
which could not be negated by evidence of intoxication due to
section 15.05(3) of the NYPL.65 As for the phrase "[u]nder
circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life,"66
the court held that this language referred to "neither the mens
rea nor the actus reus,' 6 7 but rather "the objective circumstances
in which the act occurs" 6 -"the factual setting."69 Given this new
construction, evidence of Register's intoxication could not be used
to negate the mental element of the crime, and the circumstances
surrounding his actions were enough to satisfy this new,
objective, factual element. 7' His conviction was affirmed.
This decision, "a textbook illustration of how hard cases can
make bad law,"'" took the "depravity out of depraved
indifference" 72 and would ultimately set the doctrine of depraved
murder back about twenty years. Judge Jasen's dissenting
opinion in Register analyzed the statutory history of depraved
murder, court decisions applying it, and the legislative intent
behind the new statute-all of which treated depraved
indifference as a culpable mental state-and found "no reason
why the majority should reach a different result.... ."" Judge
Jasen warned that the majority's formulation "effectively
eviscerate [d] the distinction between manslaughter in the second
degree... and murder in the second degree ...with respect to
For a reckless offender, the
the accused's state of mind. 7
difference between murder and manslaughter-a difference of
"about 15 years in prison"75 -now hinged not on the "vicious
6 Id. at 278, 457 N.E.2d at 708, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 603 ("'[R]ecklessness' is the
mens rea, and the only mens rea, of the crime .....
65 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
6 Id. § 125.25(2).
67 Register, 60 N.Y.2d at 276, 457 N.E.2d at 707, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 602.
Id. at 278, 457 N.E.2d at 708, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 603.
69 Id. at 276, 457 N.E.2d at 707, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 602.
70 Id. at 280, 457 N.E.2d at 709, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 604.
71 Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 37, at 466.
72 Id.; see also People v. Sanchez, 98 N.Y.2d 373, 407, 777 N.E.2d 204, 227, 748
N.Y.S.2d 312, 335 (2002) (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting), overruled by People v.
Feingold, 7 N.Y.3d 288, 852 N.E.2d 1163, 819 N.Y.S.2d 691 (2006).
73 Register, 60 N.Y.2d at 282, 457 N.E.2d at 710, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 605 (Jasen, J.,
dissenting).
74 Id. at 284, 457 N.E.2d at 711, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 606.
75 Id. at 285, 457 N.E.2d at 712, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 607 (citing Gegan, supra note
56, at 442).
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will" 76 or increased culpability of the offender, but on the
"technical distinction between a 'grave' risk and a 'substantlal'
one."7 7 Judge Jasen cautioned that in most cases, the fact that a
death occurred would be enough to convince a jury with 20/20
hindsight that the circumstances presented the "grave" risk of
death required for a murder conviction.78 These concerns would
Register opened the door for
prove to be well-founded.
prosecutors to use depraved murder as a fallback for intentional
murder in those cases where recklessness could be proved, but
intent could not. 9
A similarly discontented and equally prophetic dissenting
opinion was written by Judge Bellacosa six years later in People
v.Roe, 0 a case involving a fatal game of "Polish roulette."8 ' In
Roe, a six judge majority reaffirmed Register's objective risk
formulation of depraved murder. Judge Bellacosa expressed
concern that the prosecutorial practice of "overcharging
traditional reckless manslaughter conduct as the more serious
murderous conduct" was becoming standard operating procedure
for New York courts.8 2 In fact, it was.
Thirteen years later, in People v. Sanchez, 3 the defendant,
who shot and killed a long-time friend during a scuffle, was
acquitted of intentional murder but convicted of depraved
indifference murder. The majority again reaffirmed the Register
formulation and held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain
The dissenting
a conviction of depraved indifference murder.'
76

Id. at 284, 457 N.E.2d at 711, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 606 (quoting Roscoe Pound,

Introduction to FRANCIS BOWES SAYRE, A SELECTION OF CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW

xxix, xxxvi (1927)).
71 Id. at 285, 457 N.E.2d at 712, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 607.
7 Id. at 287, 457 N.E.2d at 713, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 608.
9 See id. at 287 n.4, 457 N.E.2d at 713, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 608. This is
troublesome given the fact that the legislature explicitly categorized reckless
homicide as the grade C felony of second degree manslaughter rather than the grade
A-I felony of first degree murder. Id. at 286, 457 N.E.2d at 713, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 608.
80 74 N.Y.2d 20, 542 N.E.2d 610, 544 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1989) (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting).
81 Id. at 22, 542 N.E.2d at 610, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 297 (majority opinion). In
"Polish roulette," a mix of "live" and "dummy" shells are loaded at random into the
magazine of a 12-gauge shotgun. Id. The players point the gun at each other and
pull the trigger, not knowing whether a live or dummy round is being fired. Id.
82 Id. at 35, 542 N.E.2d at 619, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 306 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
s 98 N.Y.2d 373, 777 N.E.2d 204, 748 N.Y.S.2d 312 (2002), overruled by People
v. Feingold, 7 N.Y.3d 288, 852 N.E.2d 1163, 819 N.Y.S.2d 691 (2006).
1 Id. at 386, 777 N.E.2d at 212, 748 N.Y.S.2d at 320.
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opinions expressed the same concerns as Judges Jasen and
Bellacosa, that juries would be asked to decide between crimes
that are fifteen years apart in terms of minimum sentences,
based on "the razor-thin distinction between 'substantial' and
'grave.' ,s In addition, the dissenters in Sanchez expressed
concern that depraved indifference murder was also becoming
virtually indistinguishable from intentional murder, given the
large amount of cases charging defendants with both crimes.
Thus, in theory and in practice, depraved murder, intentional
murder, and manslaughter were becoming conflated, and
depraved murder was becoming "a tactical weapon of choice" 6 for
prosecutors. While the dissenters in Register and Roe were
predicting future problems with the Register holding, the
dissenters in Sanchez were able to reflect on twenty years under
Register and analyze the actual effect it was having on the penal
system. Citing New York indictment statistics, Judge Rosenblatt
explained:
According to the Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS),
in 1989 only 19% of all Penal Law § 125.25 indictments
contained a count of depraved indifference murder. By 2001,
prosecutors charged depraved indifference murder in 70% of all
murder indictments. During that same period, while the
number of murder indictments fell by 50% from 1315 to 666 per
year, the number of depraved indifference
murder charges
87
nearly doubled from 246 to 468 annually.
At this point, it became fairly clear that the fears and concerns of
dissenters had become a reality. Sanchez would prove to be the
last hurrah for the Register doctrine.
C.

The Modern Doctrine:From Hafeez to Feingold

Shortly after Sanchez, beginning in 2003, a number of Court
of Appeals decisions began pointing the law of depraved
indifference murder in a new--or old--direction. In People v.
Hafeez,ss People v. Gonzalez, 9 and People v. Payne,9 ° all of the
defendants had been acquitted of intentional murder, but found
s Id. at 407, 777 N.E.2d at 228, 748 N.Y.S.2d at 336 (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting).
8 Id. at 402, 777 N.E.2d at 224, 748 N.Y.S.2d at 332.
s Id. at 401, 777 N.E.2d at 223-24, 748 N.Y.S.2d at 331-32 (footnote omitted)
(citation omitted).
'8 100 N.Y.2d 253, 792 N.E.2d 1060, 762 N.Y.S.2d 572 (2003).
89 1 N.Y.3d 464, 807 N.E.2d 273, 775 N.Y.S.2d 224 (2004).
903 N.Y.3d 266, 819 N.E.2d 634, 786 N.Y.S.2d 116 (2004).
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guilty of depraved indifference murder. In all three cases, the
Court of Appeals held that the evidence was insufficient to
support a charge of depraved indifference murder and began rewidening the doctrinal gap between depraved and intentional
murder. Fundamentally, these opinions were based on the
concept that "[i]ndifference to the victim's life ... contrasts with
the intent to take it." 91
Finally in 2005, with People v. Suarez,92 the Court of Appeals
sought to demarcate the differing statutory categories of
homicide and escape the conflated, muddled formulation of these
offenses under Register and Sanchez. The court put its foot down
with respect to twin-count indictments-those charging a
defendant with both depraved and intentional murder-and
solidified the principle that intent to kill is inconsistent with the
mental culpability required for depraved indifference murder:
Twin-count
[TIwin-count indictments... should be rare.
submissions to a jury, even rarer. For by the time the proof has
been presented, it should be obvious in most cases whether or
not the evidence establishes an intentional [killing] .... [T]rial
courts should presume that the defendant's conduct falls within
only one category of murder and, unless compelling evidence is
presented to the contrary, dismiss the count that is least
appropriate to the facts.93
Unless there is "compelling evidence" that supports a theory of
both intent and depraved indifference, one of the two charges
must be dismissed. Given the contrasting nature of these two
mental states, 94 it is difficult to imagine many fact patterns
marked by such dexterity.
With regard to one-on-one killings, "when but a single person
is endangered,"9 5 the court denoted only two circumstances that
would support a charge of depraved indifference murder-torture
and abandoning a helpless victim. 96
The line of cases from Hafeez to Suarez significantly
weakened the Register/Sanchez formulation of depraved murder,

91 Id. at 270, 819 N.E.2d at 635, 786 N.Y.S.2d at 117.
6 N.Y.3d 202, 844 N.E.2d 721, 811 N.Y.S.2d 267 (2005).
11 Id. at 215, 44 N.E.2d at 731, 811 N.Y.S.2d at 277 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citation omitted).
94 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
9' Suarez, 6 N.Y.3d at 212, 844 N.E.2d at 729, 811 N.Y.S.2d at 275.
1 Id. at 212, 844 N.E.2d at 729, 811 N.Y.S.2d at 275.
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but did not overrule it.97 The 2006 decision of People v. Feingold 8
explicitly overruled Register and Sanchez and distilled the
concept that had been part of the judicial fog surrounding
depraved indifference murder since Judge Jasen's dissent in
Register. Judge Smith, writing for the four-judge majority stated
quite bluntly, "depraved indifference to human life is a culpable
mental state."9 9 For the first time, the Court of Appeals of New
York explicitly recognized a culpable mental state not contained
within article 15 of the NYPL 10 0 and in doing so, put the
depravity back in depraved indifference murder.
The defendant in Feingold attempted suicide in his twelfthfloor Manhattan apartment-he sealed the apartment door with
tape, turned on his gas stove, took tranquilizers, and went to
sleep in front of the oven hoping the gas would kill him.1 °1
Several hours later, a spark from the refrigerator ignited the gas
and caused a large explosion that heavily damaged several
neighboring apartments. Miraculously, no one in the building
was killed or seriously injured. The defendant survived the
explosion and was charged with first degree reckless
endangerment, 10 2 which is identical to the depraved indifference
murder statute with the exception of the phrase, "and thereby
causes the death of another person."0 3 The phrase "under
circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life"
has the same meaning in both offenses.10 4 The new construction
of this phrase adopted by Feingold now required a wholly
subjective look at the defendant's state of mind. The court

9' Although, the three concurring judges in Suarez stated that they would
"explicitly" overrule Register. See id. at 217, 844 N.E.2d at 732-33, 811 N.Y.S.2d at
278-79 (G.B. Smith, Rosenblatt, and R.S. Smith, JJ., concurring).
98 7 N.Y.3d 288, 852 N.E.2d 1163, 819 N.Y.S.2d 691 (2006).
11 Id. at 294, 852 N.E.2d at 1167, 819 N.Y.S.2d at 695.
100 See Abraham Abramovsky & Jonathan I. Edelstein, In Search of the Point of
No Return: Policano v. Herbert and the Retroactivity of New York's Recent Depraved
Indifference MurderJurisprudence,57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 973, 974 (2007).

"I Feingold, 7 N.Y.3d at 290, 852 N.E.2d at 1164, 819 N.Y.S.2d at 692.
102

N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.25 (McKinney 2008) ("A person is guilty of reckless

endangerment in the first degree when, under circumstances evincing a depraved
indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave

risk of death to another person.").
103
104

Id.; Id. § 125.25(2).
Id. §§ 120.25, 125.25(2); Feingold, 7 N.Y.3d at 290, 852 N.E.2d at 1164, 819

N.Y.S.2d at 693.
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explained that "a person may [not] be guilty of a depraved
indifference crime without being depravedly indifferent."'' 1
The judge in the bench trial 10 6 determined that Feingold did
not possess such a depraved state of mind. Because he was "a
plainly depressed individual" whose focus was "upon his troubles
and himself," the court held that his state of mind did not rise to
the level of "wickedness, or abject moral deficiency" required for a
finding of depraved indifference. 10 7 "[D]epraved indifference is
best understood as an utter disregard for the value of human
life-a willingness to act not because one intends harm, but
because one simply doesn't care whether grievous harm results
or not .... "108 Even in the presence of such reckless and highly
dangerous conduct, it must be proved that the mens rea of
depraved indifference is actually present in the offender-there
is no such thing as constructive depravity. This holding has
important implications for DWI homicides, which will be
discussed in Part III.
III. DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE MURDER IN THE CONTEXT OF DWI
HOMICIDES

For as long as the automobile has existed, people have been
drinking and driving. 10 9 For a long time, the problem of drunk
driving and its impact on society flew under the radar. The
1980s marked a drastic increase in public concern and awareness
of drunk driving. 1 0 Anti-drunk driving groups were formed,'
media coverage increased, and legislation was passed to address
Since this time and continuing presently,
the problem." 2
prosecutors have been bringing charges of depraved indifference
Feingold,7 N.Y.3d at 295, 852 N.E.2d at 1167-68, 819 N.Y.S.2d at 696.
Id.
at 295, 852 N.E.2d at 1168, 819 N.Y.S.2d at 696.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 298, 852 N.E.2d at 1170, 819 N.Y.S.2d at 698 (quoting People v.
Suarez, 6 N.Y.3d 202, 214, 844 N.E.2d 721, 730, 811 N.Y.S.2d 267, 276 (2005)).
'o9 See ALAN A. CAVAIOLA & CHARLES WUTH, ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT OF
THE DWI OFFENDER 1 (2002).
105
106

110 See id.
111 Mothers

Against Drunk Driving, History, httpJ/www.madd.org/AboutUs/About-Us/History.aspx (last visited Sept. 21, 2008); Students Against Drunk
Driving, History, http://www.sadd.org/history.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2008).
112 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, New York STOP-DWI: A
Model of Excellence, TRAFFIC SAFETY DIGEST, Spring 2002, available at
see
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/outreach/safedige/spring2/S02WO5_NY.htm;
also infra note 241 and accompanying text.
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murder in DWI homicides. These charges are not the norm:
They are typically brought in particularly tragic or high-profile
cases involving reckless driving, extreme intoxication, or the
113
death of several people where increased punishment is desired.
In the media frenzy of the recent murder conviction of Martin
Heidgen, statements made by prosecutors, victims' families, and
the general public indicated support of murder charges in DWI
cases and expressed the opinion that they should be brought with
more regularity. It is the position of this Note that given the
current state of affairs of depraved indifference murder in New
York and the purpose for which the offense was created, the
overwhelming majority of DWI homicides do not rise to the level
of depraved indifference murder and cannot properly be charged
as such. In order for a charge of murder to be brought in the
context of a DWI, there must be conscious conduct independent of
drunk driving that evinces the depraved state of mind required
for a charge of murder.
A.

What Is Depraved Indifference Murder?

A person is guilty of depraved indifference murder when
"[u]nder circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to
human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a
grave risk of death to another person, and thereby causes the

113 See, e.g., People v. Lazartes, 23 A.D.3d 400, 401-02, 805 N.Y.S.2d 558, 560
(2d Dep't 2005) (driver sped and drove recklessly); People v. Hoffman, 283 A.D.2d
928, 928, 725 N.Y.S.2d 494, 496 (4th Dep't 2001) (intoxicated driver led police on
high-speed chase); People v. Padula, 197 A.D.2d 747, 748, 602 N.Y.S.2d 737, 738 (3d
Dep't 1993) (intoxicated driver sped on a busy street during evening rush hour,
ignoring traffic rules); People v. Chamberlain, 178 A.D.2d 783, 783, 578 N.Y.S.2d
270, 271 (3d Dep't 1991) (intoxicated driver struck and killed woman on bicycle and
fled the scene); People v. Kenny, 175 A.D.2d 404, 405, 572 N.Y.S.2d 102, 104 (3d
Dep't 1991) (intoxicated driver speeding 70-75 mph in medium to heavy traffic on
wet road); People v. Thacker, 166 A.D.2d 102, 103-04, 570 N.Y.S.2d 516, 517 (1st
Dep't 1991) (intoxicated driver had problem with shifter, failed to break, and ran
three red lights); People v. Moquin, 142 A.D.2d 347, 349, 536 N.Y.S.2d 561, 563 (3d
Dep't 1988) (female intoxicated driver swerved into oncoming lane); People v.
Peryea, No. 33-1-2006, 2006 WL 3913700, at *1 (N.Y. County Ct. Aug. 1, 2006)
(intoxicated driver crossed center line and collided head-on with another vehicle);
People v. Hopkins, No. 2004-0338, 2004 WL 3093274, at *1 (N.Y. County Ct. Aug.
30, 2004) (conviction upheld where defendant's car sped at 104 miles per hour on a
wet road in a 30 mile per hour zone, crashing into the victim's car, which had
stopped at a red light).
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death of another person."'14 This is a tall order in terms of
culpability:
To constitute depraved indifference, the defendant's conduct
must be so wanton, so deficient in a moral sense of concern, so
devoid of regard of the life or lives of others, and so
blameworthy as to warrant the same criminal liability as that
which the law imposes
upon a person who intentionally causes
115
the death of another.

Quintessential examples of such extreme conduct include
" 'shooting [a gun] into a crowd, 1 16 placing a time bomb in a public
place, or opening the door of the lions' cage in the zoo.' "117 Other
examples include "driving an automobile along a crowded
sidewalk at high speed[, ... poisoning a well from which people
are accustomed to draw water[,] opening a drawbridge as a train
is about to pass over it[,] and dropping stones from an overpass
onto a busy highway."1 1
The extreme nature of the conduct, combined with a unique
mental state, make depraved indifference murder a fairly
uncommon brand of homicide. "The vast majority of killings
simply do not meet this standard. They are suitably punished by
statutes defining intentional murder or manslaughter in the first
or second degree or criminally negligent homicide." 119 It is
important
to
understand that intentional murder is
114

N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(2) (McKinney 2008).

"' People v. Suarez, 6 N.Y.3d 202, 211, 844 N.E.2d 721, 728, 811 N.Y.S.2d 267,
274 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
116 See, e.g., People v. Fenner, 61 N.Y.2d 971, 973, 463 N.E.2d 617, 618, 475
N.Y.S.2d 276, 277 (1984) (defendant fired at several men attempting to flee a
crowded poolroom); People v. Jernatowski, 238 N.Y. 188, 190, 144 N.E. 497, 497
(1924) (defendant fired several shots into what defendant knew was an occupied
house); People v. Callender, 304 A.D.2d 426, 426, 760 N.Y.S.2d 408, 409 (1st Dep't
2003) (defendant fired shots down at a crowd of teenagers from a fifteenth-floor
balcony).
"' People v. Feingold, 7 N.Y.3d 288, 293, 852 N.E.2d 1163, 1166, 819 N.Y.S.2d
691, 695 (2006) (quoting People v. Payne, 3 N.Y.3d 266, 819 N.E.2d 634, 786
N.Y.S.2d 116 (2004)).
"' Suarez, 6 N.Y.3d at 214, 844 N.E.2d at 730, 811 N.Y.S.2d at 276; see also
People v. Gomez, 65 N.Y.2d 9, 10, 478 N.E.2d 759, 760, 489 N.Y.S.2d 156, 157 (1985)
(defendant drove a vehicle on a busy city sidewalk); People v. Damiano, 255 A.D.2d
703, 704, 681 N.Y.S.2d 104, 105 (3d Dep't 1998) (defendant dropped fifty-two pound
boulder from a traffic overpass onto oncoming traffic, killing a woman instantly).
119 Suarez, 6 N.Y.3d at 211, 844 N.E.2d at 728, 811 N.Y.S.2d at 274; see also
People v. Peryea, No. 33-1-2006, 2006 WL 3913700, at *2 (N.Y. County Ct. Aug. 1,
2006) ("[I]t is difficult to conceive of many actions resulting in an unintentional
murder which should be classified at the same level as intentional murder.").
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distinguishable from depraved murder not because it is more
culpable or immoral-they are simply different offenses. In fact,
intentional murder is viewed as identical to depraved
indifference murder in terms of culpability-both are defined as
second degree murder, both are non-violent A-I felonies, and both
share the same minimum and maximum sentences under article
70.120 Depraved indifference murder is a crime that is precisely
as serious as intentional murder. The distinction between the
two is qualitative, not quantitative.
The statutory language that distinguishes depraved murder
from other homicide offenses is "a depraved indifference to
human life."121
[Dlepraved indifference is best understood as an utter disregard
for the value of human life-a willingness to act not because one
intends harm, but because one simply doesn't care whether
grievous harm results or not. Reflecting wickedness, evil or
inhumanity, as manifested by brutal, heinous and despicable
acts, depraved indifference is embodied in conduct that is "so
wanton, so deficient in a moral sense of concern, so devoid of
regard of the life or lives of others, and so blameworthy" as to
render the actor as culpable as one whose conscious objective is
to kill .... 122
The important question that remains then, is whether DWI
homicides fit within the highly specialized, substantially limited
statutory nook of depraved indifference murder, or whether they
are like the "overwhelming majority of homicides that are
prosecuted in New York," in which "[d]epraved indifference
murder may not be properly charged.' 2 3
B.

Category 1-Those DWI Homicides That Cannot Support a
Charge of Murder
There are two types of DWI homicides-those that can
sustain a charge of depraved indifference murder and those that
120 See infra app. A.

121N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(2) (McKinney 2008).
122 Suarez, 6 N.Y.3d at 214, 844 N.E.2d at 730, 811 N.Y.S.2d at 276 (quoting
People v. Russell, 91 N.Y.2d 280, 287, 693 N.E.2d 193, 194, 670 N.Y.S.2d 166, 168
(1998)). This language was ultimately adopted by the court in Feingold. 7 N.Y.3d at
296, 852 N.E.2d at 1168, 819 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
123Suarez, 6 N.Y.3d at 207, 844 N.E.2d at 725, 811 N.Y.S.2d at 271 (quoting
People v. Payne, 3 N.Y.3d 266, 270, 819 N.E.2d 634, 636, 786 N.Y.S.2d 116, 117
(2004)).
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cannot. Category 1 represents the overwhelming majority of
DWI cases where a charge of murder cannot stand. Category 2
carves out those rare cases that may support a charge of murder.
Category 1 refers to the typical case of drinking and driving.
No matter how extreme the drinking or how poor the driving,
these cases do not rise to the level of a depraved indifference to
human life. "The fact that an individual is driving a vehicle
while in an intoxicated condition and, as a result, causes the
death of another, cannot, standing alone, sustain an indictment
for depraved indifference murder.
."' This category of cases
spans from the mildly drunk to the extremely drunk, and applies
to all bad driving that occurs as a result of intoxication whether
it be slightly erring in judgment, swerving, speeding, or
disregarding traffic control devices. Cases within Category 1
cannot properly be charged as depraved indifference murder
because the conduct and risk involved is not indicative of a
mental state rising to the level of a "depraved indifference to
human life."125
1.

Conduct

Because we cannot see into the mind of an offender, "the
various degrees of culpability specified in [article 15 of the NYPL]
are not capable of direct proof. They are, instead, to be inferred
from the facts and circumstances proved ....
The mental
state of "depraved indifference to human life" must be
established in the same way. 127 Thus, in an effort to ascertain an
offender's state of mind, we must look at his conduct and the
facts and circumstances involved in a DWI.
Although depraved indifference murder describes an
unintentional killing, there is always conscious, purposeful, and
intentional conduct involved. Among the classic examples of
depraved murder, 128 none are performed with an intent to kill,
124 People v. Peryea, 33-1-2006, 2006 WL 3913700, at *3 (N.Y. County Ct. Aug.
1, 2006).
125 Feingold, 7 N.Y.3d at 296, 852 N.E.2d at 1168, 819 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
126 People v. Green, 56 N.Y.2d 427, 432, 437 N.E.2d 1146, 1149, 452 N.Y.S.2d
389, 392 (1982) (citing People v. Stanfield, 36 N.Y.2d 467, 473, 369 N.Y.S.2d 118,
122, 330 N.E.2d 75, 78 (1975)).
12' Feingold, 7 N.Y.3d at 296, 852 N.E.2d at 1168-69, 819 N.Y.S.2d at 697 ("The
mens rea of depraved indifference to human life can, like any other mens rea, be
proved by circumstantial evidence.").
121 See supra notes 117-118 and accompanying text.
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but all result in death and qualify as "circumstances evincing a
depraved indifference to human life." 129 These examples involve
purposeful, conscious conduct from which the abject moral
depravity and extreme indifference required for a charge of
murder can be inferred.
The act of drinking and driving does not rise to this level of
depravity. The first step in making this determination is to
identify the conduct-at what point does the offender open the
lion's cage, drop the stone, or pull the trigger? The conscious
decision made in all DWI homicides is the decision to drive a car
in an intoxicated state-this is the culpable act. Driving a car, by
itself, does not carry with it any immoral purpose or evil
undertone-it is simply a means of transportation and it is a
wholly innocent endeavor. It is something that millions of people
do every day as early as the age of sixteen. 130 The same cannot
be said for shooting a gun, releasing a vicious animal, dropping a
large rock from a high place, planting a bomb, poisoning a well,
or opening a drawbridge as a train approaches. These actions
involve a priori, a high degree of danger and moral wickedness.
Choosing to drive while intoxicated is certainly a culpable act,
but it does not evince the "depraved indifference to human life"
required for murder charge. This is due to a combination of the
risk involved and the mental state of the offender.
2.

Risk and Mental State

Given the wording of the statute and the new, court-defined
mental state of "depraved indifference to human life," it is
difficult to separate an assessment of risk from an assessment of
the offender's state of mind, because the two are related:
[A] discussion of the nuances of the actor's mind-how forcibly
the likelihood of a fatal result was borne in upon him and his
willingness to let come what may-is very much related to the
degree of risk itself. The more dangerous the act was, the more
likely the actor was willing to kill in performing it.13 '

129

N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(2) (McKinney 2008).

.30 See

New York Department of Motor Vehicles, General Information About
Driver Licenses, http://www.nydmv.state.ny.us/license.htm (last visited Sept. 21,
2008).
131Gegan, supra note 56, at 448 (emphasis added).
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In DWI cases, the combination of the risk involved and the
offender's state of mind make a charge of depraved indifference
murder untenable.
a.

Risk

To avoid delving into the quagmire of intoxication and mens
rea just yet, 13 2 let us assume that all people making the decision
to drive drunk are fully aware of the extent of their own
intoxication and are able to recognize the actual degree of risk
involved in driving in this condition.
There is always a degree of risk involved in taking a car on
the open road, but the decision to drive under the influence of
alcohol significantly increases this risk.133 The degree to which
this risk is increased is difficult to quantify and will almost
certainly vary among individuals as everyone possesses different
driving skills and reacts differently to alcohol. 3 Nevertheless, it
is critical to determine, on a general level, the degree of risk
involved. In 2002, in the United States, there were 43,005 traffic
fatalities, 17,524 (41 percent) of which were alcohol related. 135 In
this same year, the estimated number of episodes of alcoholimpaired driving was 159 million.'3 6 These figures indicate that
only .01% of all incidents of impaired driving resulted in a
fatality-i.e., for every decision that was made to drive drunk,
only about one in every 10,000 resulted in a death. These
decisions carry with them a degree of risk, but do not rise to the
level of shooting a gun into a crowd, driving over a crowded
sidewalk, or poisoning a person's drinking water-actions where
the risk is grave, and death is almost certain to occur. Instead of
taking a taxi, walking home, or sleeping at a friend's house, an
intoxicated person likely makes the decision to drive because he
assesses the risk to be low and believes that his chances of killing
'
133

See infra Part III.B.2.b.
H.

LAWRENCE

Ross

& JOSEPH R. GuSFIELD, CONFRONTING DRUNK DRIVING:

SOCIAL POLICY FOR SAVING LIVES 35 (1992) ("[D]runk driving greatly increases the

risk of a crash, especially a fatal one.").
4 Scientific studies use statistics to estimate and quantify the increased
relative risk over a number of different variables. See Paul L. Zador, Alcohol-Related
Relative Risk of FatalDriver Injuries in Relation to Driver Age and Sex, 52 J. STUD.
ON ALCOHOL 302, 302-10 (1991).

"IsAlcohol Alert, 2005 Drunk Driving Statistics, http://www.alcoholalert.coml
drunk-driving-statistics-2005.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2008).
136Kyran P. Quinlan et al., Alcohol-Impaired Driving Among U.S. Adults, 19932002, 28 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 346, 346-50 (2005).
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someone are remote. The statistics support this assessmentevery year, millions of people drive under the influence of alcohol
without incident. In People v. Roe-the Polish roulette caseJudge Bellacosa addressed the issue of statistical probability in
his dissent:
[T]he murder penalty should be imposed only when the degree
of risk approaches certainty; that is, at the point where reckless
homicide becomes knowing homicide. Here, defendant's actions
cannot be said to have created an almost certain risk of death.
The mathematical probabilities, the objective state of mind
evidence at and around the critical moment ... and all the
circumstances surrounding this tragic incident all render the
risk uncertain and counterindicate depravity, callousness and
indifference of the137level fictionally equalling premeditated,
intentional murder.
Given the statistics cited above, it cannot be said that the
risk of death from DWI is "almost certain." 13 While it is well
established that "drunk driving greatly increases the risk of a
[fatal] crash,... the likelihood of a crash fatality on any given
trip-even an alcohol impaired one-remains extremely low."139
b.

Mental State
The foregoing analysis assesses risk with the aid of statistics
from an outside, objective standpoint and assumes that all people
making a decision to drive drunk are aware both of the extent of
their own intoxication and the actual level of risk involved. Even
in this hypothetical case of an omniscient offender, the risk is not
high enough to support a charge of depraved indifference
murder. 4 '
In People v. Feingold, "depraved indifference to
human life" became a culpable mental state, moving the analysis
to a subjective assessment of the offender's actual state of mind"a person may [not] be guilty of a depraved indifference crime
without being depravedly indifferent."'
In Feingold, the
defendant was not found to be depravedly indifferent despite the
137 People v. Roe, 74 N.Y.2d 20, 33, 542 N.E.2d 610, 617, 544 N.Y.S.2d 297, 304
(1989) (Bellacosa, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis
omitted) (citation omitted).
138 Id.
139 ROSS & GUSFIELD, supra note 133.
140 See supra Part III.B.2.a.
141 People v. Feingold, 7 N.Y.3d 288, 295, 852 N.E.2d 1163, 1167-68, 819
N.Y.S.2d 691, 696 (2006).
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fact that he filled his apartment with highly flammable gas,
intentionally went to sleep, and ultimately caused a large
explosion in a densely-occupied building. 142
The factfinder
determined that the defendant acted out of depression and
sorrow, without the malicious indifference required for a charge
of depraved murder. 143 Thus, even an act with an extremely high
objective level of risk 44 cannot amount to murder unless the
offender recognizes this grave risk of death and "simply doesn't
care" if someone dies. 45
The intoxicated mind of a DWI offender must be analyzed
with this in mind. All DWI offenders are intoxicated to some
degree, and so this is an appropriate starting point for a
discussion of mental state. Article 15 of the NYPL allows
evidence of intoxication to negate the presence of culpable mental
states146 with the exception of recklessness.14 7 Under Register,
the mens rea required for depraved indifference murder was
recklessness,""
and
so evidence
of intoxication
was
inadmissible. 49
Since Feingold, the mens rea is no longer
recklessness, and evidence of a defendant's intoxication is no
longer statutorily prohibited.'
The effect of Feingold on
intoxication has yet to reach the Court of Appeals, but in the
Appellate Division case of People v. Coon,15 1 the court stated that
the defendant-who was under the influence of crack cocaineSee supra note 101 and accompanying text.
1' See supra notes 105-107 and accompanying text.
142

144 Feingold's conduct probably meets the requirement of a "grave risk of death,"
as required by section 125.25(2) of the New York Penal Law, given the fact that it is
essentially the same as "placing a time bomb in a public place." Feingold, 7 N.Y.3d
at 293, 852 N.E.2d at 1166, 819 N.Y.S.2d at 695 (quoting People v. Payne, 3 N.Y.3d
266, 272, 819 N.E.2d 634, 637, 786 N.Y.S.2d 116, 119 (2004)).
145 Feingold, 7 N.Y.3d at 296, 852 N.E.2d at 1168, 819 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
146 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.25 (McKinney 2008); see also supra notes 27-28 and
accompanying text.
147 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05(3); see also supra note 29 and accompanying text.
148 People v. Register, 60 N.Y.2d 270, 278, 457 N.E.2d 704, 708, 469 N.Y.S.2d
599, 602-03 (1983), overruled by Feingold, 7 N.Y.3d 288, 852 N.E.2d 1163, 819
N.Y.S.2d 691.
149 See id. at 280, 457 N.E.2d at 709, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 604.
15oId. at 285 n.2, 457 N.E.2d at 712, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 607 (Jasen, J., dissenting)
("While ...the Legislature could constitutionally exclude intoxication as a factor
which negates the element of 'depraved indifference' just as it has with respect to
the element of 'recklessness' (see Penal Law, § 15.05, subd. 3), the simple fact is that
the Legislature has not done so; indeed section 15.25 of the Penal Law has done just
the opposite.").
15134 A.D.3d 869, 823 N.Y.S.2d 566 (3d Dep't 2006).
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was "too intoxicated to form a specific criminal intent" and was
"incapable of possessing the culpable mental state necessary to
prove depraved indifference."15 2 Similarly, Judge Jasen's dissent
in Register explained that if the defendant could show that "as a
result of his intoxication he was not aware of what he was doing
and the risks involved and was not, therefore, competent to
consciously disregard those risks," he could not be convicted of
depraved indifference murder. 15 3 Under Feingold, the same must
be said for DWI offenders.
In a DWI offense, the culpable act lies not in the offender's
poor driving while intoxicated or failure to avoid hazards on the
road, but in the decision to drive itself.5 " It is at this moment
that the mental state of the offender must be assessed.
Intoxicated individuals are certainly aware that they have been
drinking and are usually aware that they are intoxicated, to
some extent. Most people however-especially those who are
highly intoxicated-cannot perform an accurate self-assessment
of their own intoxication and are unable to recognize the risks
associated with driving in such a state. 55 A product of this is the
uncomfortable scene of a person who is clearly intoxicated trying
to obtain his keys because he believes that he is "fine to drive
home." Another contributor to this belief is the nature of the
activity itself. Most people drive all of the time and do not
consider it to be a difficult or extremely dangerous activity.
Often, they only have to drive a short distance on familiar roads
in order to get home. The combination of these factors, combined
with the fact that many people do this or know people who do it
fairly often without incident, creates the honest belief in
intoxicated individuals that they are capable of driving safely.
The possibility of causing death rarely enters this calculation on
a serious level or presents itself as a plausible consequence.
Most people probably see getting pulled over as a more realistic

Id. at 870, 823 N.Y.S.2d at 567.
"I Register, 60 N.Y.2d at 282-83, 457 N.E.2d at 710-11, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 605
(Jasen, J., dissenting).
154 There
may be cases where a drunk driver intentionally engages in an
additional culpable (and possibly depraved) act while driving. This will be
addressed, infra Part III.C.
155 See S. George, R.D. Rogers & T. Duka, The Acute Effect of Alcohol on
Decision Making in Social Drinkers, 182 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 160, 166-67 (2005)
(concluding that alcohol acutely affects decision making and assessment of risk).
152
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risk, but even this is unlikely.'5 6 Whether death is viewed as
impossible, highly unlikely, or improbable makes no difference.
None of these assessments evince a disregard for the value of
human life. If death is thought to be an improbable result of the
act, it cannot be said that the actor "simply does not care" if
someone is killed, and it surely cannot be said that this act is as
blameworthy as intentional murder. Although this drunken
assessment may not be accurate, it is an integral part of the
offender's decision to drive and does not speak to a mens rea of a
depraved indifference to human life.
A person may be quite conscious of creating a risk of injury and
death yet believe that it will not happen. He is too skillful or
clever or lucky to have anything like that happen! When he
proves to be wrong, it is manslaughter.
This actor
is ... distinguishable from one who is under no illusions,
who
157
care.
not
does
just
but
killed,
be
will
someone
believes
In many cases, an intoxicated person may not make such a
skewed assessment.
Rather, the person does not make an
assessment at all. Actions made by intoxicated people are proven
to be highly impulsive and rarely well-calculated. People make
decisions with little or no thought, in a primitive, somewhat
hedonistic manner.
While most sober people know that if they drink and drive they
might get a ticket, get in an accident, or end up killing
themselves and someone else, inebriated people are only able to
focus on one cue at a time. They are not able to weigh the costs
and benefits of their actions. They might only be able to focus
on the benefits-"I
am tired, I want to go home, and so I will
58
drive home."
Even in cases where the actor decides to drive with no evaluation
or assessment of risk, it cannot be said that he is depraved.
Depravity is not defined as a failure to assess risk or consider the

156 In 2004 there were approximately 1.4 million arrests made for driving under
the influence of alcohol or drugs. Compare NAT'L CTR. FOR STATISTICS & ANALYSIS,
NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS: ALCOHOL 2

(2006), available at http'//www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/810616.pdf, with supra note
136 and accompanying text.
157 Gegan, supra note 56, at 444.
"5 Interview with Tara K. McDonald, Ph.D., Professor of Psychology, Queen's
Univ. (Ont., Can.) (Aug. 28, 2007); see also Tara K. McDonald et al., Decision Making
in Altered States: Effects of Alcohol on Attitudes and Driving, 68 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 973, 975 (1995).

2008]

DEPRAVED INDIFFERNCEIN DWI HOMICIDES

1563

consequences of one's action-it requires first the recognition of a
grave risk and then indifference to it. This point is illustrated in
the holding of Feingold.5 9 If unhappiness and gloom are enough
to show that an offender did not act with depraved indifference,
surely the much more palpable state of intoxication can do so.
Intoxication is medically proven to hinder a person's ability to
make decisions, assess risk, and think clearly. 16' A drunk driver
who fails to consider the risks or consequences of his actions
commits "an extremely reckless and foolish act[,] not because of
his lack of regard for the lives of others" 161 but because of his
intoxication and inability to validly assess the situation in that
state. Such offenders do not exhibit the mental state of a
"depraved indifference to human life1 62 and must be punished
under one of the lesser and more appropriate homicide felonies of
1 63
the NYPL.
3.

Comparative Culpability

Historically and modernly, depraved indifference murder has
6
been defined as an offense as culpable as intentional murder."
This is reflected both in the courts' discussion of the crime and
the sentencing provisions of article 70 that treat the offenses
identically.' 6 5 The level of culpability involved is very much a
part of its definition and is at the root of its purpose. Thus, in
the interest of proportionality, it is important to examine the
culpability involved in a DWI homicide. If a DWI homicide is to
rise to the level of depraved indifference murder, it must be as
culpable as intentional murder and more culpable than the lesser
felonies. An assessment of the various homicide offenses reveals
that this is not the case.
"[T]he Legislature has enacted a statutory system in which
each category of homicide is defined uniquely and distinctly from
every other, thus ensuring that a killer's punishment is
1'9 See People v. Feingold, 7 N.Y.3d 288, 296-97, 852 N.E.2d 1163, 1168-69, 819
N.Y.S.2d 691, 697 (2006).
160 See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
161 Feingold, 7 N.Y.3d at 295, 852 N.E.2d at 1168, 819 N.Y.S.2d at 696.
112 Id. at 294, 852 N.E.2d at 1167, 819 N.Y.S.2d at 695.
163 See infra Part LV.B.
16 People v. Suarez, 6 N.Y.3d 202, 214, 844 N.E.2d 721, 730, 811 N.Y.S.2d 267,
276 (2005); see also supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text; supra note 120 and
accompanying text.
165 See infra app. A.
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commensurate with the degree of criminal culpability established
1-.
Tl.
1- T
During this discussion, it will be helpful to
uy Ule rel l .,aw.
look at appendix A.
The offenses are listed in order of
seriousness based on grade and sentencing, allowing a
determination of the appropriate placement of DWI homicides
based on culpability. A good starting point is second degree
murder-intentional murder. 167 Intentional murder describes
conduct where it is the offender's "conscious objective" to cause
the death of another person. 168 To conjure examples of this kind
of conduct requires only that one choose randomly from a
virtually endless throng of cases. Typical cases include those
where a victim is purposely shot, 69 stabbed, 70 or beaten 7 ' to
death by an offender. In terms of culpability, an offense of this
magnitude is a far cry from a DWI homicide. An intentional
killer consciously pulls a trigger or thrusts a knife with the
intent to kill, while a drunk driver makes a poor choice in an
intoxicated state and accidentally causes a death.
The next offense down the ladder of culpability is first degree
manslaughter. First degree manslaughter can be charged when
an intentional murder is reduced to manslaughter via the
1 72
affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance ("EED").
While an intentional act committed under EED may be less
culpable than an intentional act alone, it is still more culpable,
more evil, and more wanton than a DWI homicide.'7 3 The
decision to kill another human being is still present, regardless
whether it was made on a whim of extreme emotion or after
careful premeditation-an intentional murder is simply more
culpable. Another form of first degree manslaughter is when an
offender intends to inflict serious physical injury on a person, but
I

-

-

166 Suarez,

19C

6 N.Y.3d at 207, 844 N.E.2d at 725, 811 N.Y.S.2d at 271.
For sake of brevity the discussion of second degree murder will be limited to
intentional murder.
16 N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 15.05(1), 125.25(1) (McKinney 2008).
169 See, e.g., People v. Gehy, 238 A.D.2d 354, 354, 656 N.Y.S.2d 58, 59 (2d Dep't
1997) (defendant shot victim five times in the head after ordering him to his knees).
170 See, e.g., People v. Williams, 275 A.D.2d 967, 967, 713 N.Y.S.2d 422, 422 (4th
Dep't 2000) (defendant stabbed victim six times while he knelt and begged for his
life).
171 See, e.g., People v. Vukel, 263 A.D.2d 416, 416, 695 N.Y.S.2d 73, 73 (1st Dep't
1999) (defendant struck victim repeatedly in the head and body with a baseball bat).
172 N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.25(1)(a).
173 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
167
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ends up accidentally killing the person.1 74 This too is more
culpable than a DWI homicide. This offender may not intend to
kill, but does intend to "create[] a substantial risk of
death,.., serious and protracted disfigurement, protracted
impairment of health or protracted loss or impairment of the
function of any bodily organ." 7 5 While acting to cause such
injury, the person over-inflicts to the extent that he or she causes
the victim to die. The person intends to seriously injure, but
accidentally kills. A DWI offender intends neither injury nor
death. While neither are intentional killings, the former involves
a malicious intentional act while the latter does not. The former
is more culpable.
The crime of aggravated vehicular manslaughter was
recently created to address a specific type of egregious DWI
homicide. Although it is a grade B felony like first degree
manslaughter, first degree manslaughter is a violent crime that
is governed by stricter sentencing guidelines. 7 6
It can be
inferred that this is due to the greater culpability involved, which
is in line with our analysis that even the most serious DWI
homicide is not as culpable as first degree manslaughter.
C.

Category 2-DWI Offenses That Rise to the Level of Depraved
Indifference Murder

Are murder convictions ever just in the context of a DWI
homicide? If so, when?
The first question must be answered in the affirmative. A
drunk driver is capable of evincing the mental state of "a
depraved indifference to human life." However, given the recent
changes in the New York vehicular homicide statutes and the
Court of Appeals' decision in Feingold, a charge of depraved
indifference murder in a DWI homicide should be extremely rare.
The court in People v. Peryea1 77 stated:
The fact that an individual is driving a vehicle while in an
intoxicated condition and, as a result, causes the death of
another, cannot, standing alone, sustain an indictment for
depraved indifference murder .... Something more, some
aggravating circumstance or circumstances, is needed to raise
174 N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.20(1).
175

Id. § 10.00(10).

176

See infra app. A.

177

No. 33-1-2006, 2006 WL 3913700 (N.Y. County Ct. Aug. 1, 2006).
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the level of seriousness, first to the crime of manslaughter in

the second
degree and then to the crime of murder in the second
78
1

degree.

With the current homicide scheme in place, this analysis can
be expanded to include aggravated vehicular homicide. Some
aggravating circumstances are needed to raise the level of
seriousness first to the crime of second degree manslaughter or
first degree vehicular manslaughter, then to aggravated
vehicular homicide, then to murder in the second degree.1 79
In order for a charge of murder to succeed, the defendant
must engage in conduct from which a depraved mens rea may be
inferred. This conduct cannot be an act of bad driving, poor
judgment, or slow reaction time that accompanies nearly every
It must be purposeful, wanton, immoral
DWI fatality.18 0
conduct-conduct akin to placing a time bomb in a public place or
shooting a gun in a crowded bar-conduct that is as culpable as
intentional murder.
[T]he murder prescription requires more than recklessly
causing death which could happen, for example, from gross
carelessness in motor vehicle operation.
The murder definition requires conduct with "depraved
indifference" to "human life".... This is conduct of graver
culpability, and it is the kind which has been rather well
understood at common law to involve something more serious
than mere recklessness alone which has had an incidental
tragic result. 1"1

178

Id. at *2.

infra Part IV.B. Peryea, decided before Feingold, stated that two such
aggravating factors could be the "level of intoxication and the speed of the vehicle."
Peryea, 2006 WL 3913700, at *2. Now that depraved indifference is a mental state
under Feingold, these factors would no longer be enough. See supra notes 124-125
and accompanying text. These factors may elevate the crime to one of the higher
vehicular homicide offenses or reckless manslaughter, see infra Part IV, but they do
not evince the depraved indifference to human life required by Feingold.
180 See Andrew Strickler, Jury Decision Seen as Vulnerable, NEWSDAY (Melville,
N.Y.), Oct. 18, 2006, at A6 (quoting a New York defense attorney saying that in
order to constitute murder, there must be facts which distinguish a case from the
"hundreds of other DUI fatalities").
181 People v. Poplis, 30 N.Y.2d 85, 88, 281 N.E.2d 167, 168, 330 N.Y.S.2d 365,
366 (1972). This language is significant because this case was decided before the
Court of Appeals switched to the objective risk formulation of Register. This
statement rings even truer under the now completely subjective formulation of
Feingold.
179 See
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Examples of such conduct could consist of intentionally
driving over a crowded sidewalk, through a large crowd of people,
into an occupied building, or at other cars.8 2 Even in the
presence of such conduct, the burden would be on the prosecution
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an offender engaged in
such conduct purposefully-not accidentally. If any of these acts
were done accidentally as a result of intoxication, the
"willingness to act" 8 3 or wantonness required for a charge of
murder would not be present. If a jury determined that the
defendant's conduct was purposeful or deliberate, they would
then have to determine whether the defendant engaged in such
conduct as the result of a depraved state of mind. If the
defendant was rendered unable to accurately assess the risk
associated with his conduct by reason of his intoxication or failed
to make any assessment of risk at all, the mens rea would not be
met. The decision in Feingold is a perfect example of this.
Thus, the analysis is threefold. First, was the conduct severe
enough-above and beyond ordinary recklessness-to evince a
depraved state of mind? 8 4 Second, was the conduct deliberate
and purposeful? Third, was the defendant cognizant of the grave
risk associated with the conduct and indifferent to it? If these
three questions are not answered in the affirmative, a charge of
murder cannot stand. Part III.D will apply this analysis to the
case of Martin Heidgen-one of the most recent and controversial
DWI murder cases to appear in the New York courts.

182 See, e.g., People v. Gomez, 65 N.Y.2d 9, 10-11, 478 N.E.2d 759, 760-61, 489
N.Y.S.2d 156, 157-58 (1985) (non-DWI case where automobile sped down crowded
sidewalk hitting numerous pedestrians); People v. Jernatowski, 238 N.Y. 188, 190,
144 N.E. 497, 497 (1924) (firing several shots into what defendant knew was an
occupied house); People v. Lazartes, 23 A.D.3d 400, 404, 805 N.Y.S.2d 558, 562 (2d
Dep't 2005) (detailing the facts of the Esposito case); People v. Esposito, 216 A.D.2d
317, 318, 627 N.Y.S.2d 739, 740 (2d Dep't 1995) (defendant who had been drinking
engaged in a game of "cat and mouse" whereby he chased the decedent's car at a
high rate of speed, ignored numerous traffic control devices, engaged in repeated
bumping, attempted to force the vehicle off the road, and ultimately caused the
decedent to strike a tree and die); People v. Kirkpatrick, 177 A.D.2d 508, 509, 575
N.Y.S.2d 718, 718 (2d Dep't 1991) (intoxicated defendant played chicken with cars in
opposite lane); People v. S. E-W., 13 Misc. 3d 1050, 1051-52, 827 N.Y.S.2d 557, 558
(Sup. Ct. Nassau County 2006) (defendant who had been drinking drove his
automobile at a crowd of bystanders at high speed striking four people).
183 People v. Feingold, 7 N.Y.3d 288, 296, 852 N.E.2d 1163, 1168, 819 N.Y.S.2d
691, 697 (2006).
184 See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
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D. Martin Heidgen
1.

The Facts

On July 1, 2005, twenty-four-year-old Martin Heidgen met a
friend for drinks after work at the "House of Brews" bar in
Manhattan's theatre district.18 5 Heidgen left the bar and went
home to Long Island where he proceeded to drink scotch. 186 He
later attended a party in Merrick where he commiserated with
friends and participated in drinking games.8 7 At sometime
around two o'clock in the morning on July 2, he left the party, got
88
in his 1999 Chevy Silverado pickup, and began to drive home.
During the trip, he ended up traveling north on the southbound
side of the Meadowbrook Parkway, heading in the wrong
direction towards oncoming traffic. It is unclear how far he
traveled on the parkway-probably somewhere between an
eighth of a mile and three miles.'8 9 During this time, Heidgen
passed at least two cars that were forced to pull to the side of the
road, nearly hitting one. 9 ' Shortly after passing these cars,
traveling at a speed of approximately forty-five miles per hour,
Heidgen collided head-on with a limousine that was traveling
approximately sixty miles per hour. 191
There were six people in the limo, which was on its way back
from a wedding in Bayville. 92 The collision resulted in the death
of fifty-nine-year-old driver Stanley Rabinowitz, of Farmingdale,
and the decapitation and death of seven-year-old Katie Flynn, of

185

Ann Givens, 'Self-Destruct Mode,' NEWSDAY (Melville, N.Y.), Sept. 20, 2006,

at A4 [hereinafter Self-Destruct Model.
186 Id.
187

See Ann Givens, Wrong-Way DWI Called Death Wish, NEWSDAY (Melville,

N.Y.), Sept. 10, 2005, at A2 [hereinafter Death Wish].
188 Id.; see also Robert T. Hayden, Affirmation of Indictment 1910N-05, Jan. 31,
2006 [hereinafter Affirmation].
189 The defense stated that Heidgen was on the road for "about an eighth of a
mile." Ann Givens, Witnesses Tell of Speeding Pickup, NEWSDAY (Melville, N.Y.),
Sept. 22, 2006, at A18 [hereinafter Witnesses]. Witnesses for the prosecution
indicated that it was about three miles. Id. In response to the defense's demand for a
bill of particulars, the prosecution stated that Heidgen drove for "well over a mile."
Affirmation, supra note 188.
190 Death Wish, supra note 187; Witnesses, supra note 189.
191 Affirmation, supra note 188, at 6. The speeds of both vehicles were estimated
using footage from the limo's dash camera and various time-distance and
momentum formulas. Id.
192

Self-Destruct Mode, supra note 185.
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Long Beach.' 9 3 Katie's father, Neil Flynn, and her grandparents,
Chris and Denise Tagney, were seriously injured in the accident.
Katie's mother, Jennifer Flynn, sustained less severe injuries.194
When officers arrived on the scene, they found a hysterical
Jennifer Flynn sitting against the median of the parkway,
holding her daughter's head in her arms. 195
Shortly after the accident, Heidgen's blood alcohol content
(BAC) was measured at .28%-more than three times the legal
limit of .08%.196 Nassau County prosecutors charged Heidgen
with-among
other things197 -two
counts
of depraved
indifference murder (second degree murder). 9 ' The prosecution
alleged that Heidgen "was on a suicide mission" the night of the
crash and was driving on the wrong side of the parkway on
purpose, in an effort to end his own life.' 9 9 The most significant
piece of evidence supporting this theory was an alleged
statement made by Heidgen at the hospital to a police officer ten
hours after the crash in which he described himself as being in
"self-destruct mode."2 °°
Based on this conversation, the
prosecution also proffered testimony from the officer that
Heidgen had gotten into an argument with his ex-girlfriend on
the phone that evening, that he was having financial problems,
and that his mother's remarriage was adding stress to his life.2 0
Prosecutors further argued that even if he was unaware of the
fact that he was on the wrong side of the road, Heidgen's decision
Death Wish, supra note 187.
Affirmation, supra note 188, at 1-2.
.5
Ann Givens, After Fight, Deadly Drive, NEWSDAY (Melville, N.Y.), Apr. 4,
2006, at A18 [hereinafter Deadly Drive].
196 Michael Frazier, State Police To Probe Blood Mishandling, NEWSDAY
(Melville, N.Y.), Sept. 21, 2006; Ann Givens, Lawyer Wants Alcohol Test Out,
NEWSDAY (Melville, N.Y.), Apr. 6, 2006, at A36 [hereinafter Alcohol Test]. This BAC
reading indicates that Heidgen had approximately fourteen drinks in his system at
the time of the crash. Ann Givens, DNA Testimony Allowed, NEWSDAY (Melville,
N.Y.), Sept. 27, 2006, at A16.
197 Heidgen was indicted on two counts of depraved indifference murder, three
counts of assault in the first degree, two counts of reckless endangerment in the first
degree, and two counts of operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol.
Nassau County Supreme Court Grand Jury Indictment, Ind. No. 1910N/05, Aug. 31,
2005.
198 It is important to note that Heidgen's trial began two months after the Court
of Appeals' decision in Feingold.
199 Deadly Drive, supra note 195; Death Wish, supra note 187.
200 Self-Destruct Mode, supra note 185.
201 Id.
193

194
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to drink to the extreme and then drive established the depravity
required for a charge of murderYul
The defense countered that Heidgen was in fact happy and
in good spirits the night of the crash, but as a result of his
intoxication was unable to realize he was on the wrong side of the
road until it was too late.20 3 Phone records were presented which
indicated that there had been no phone conversation with an exgirlfriend.20 4 With regard to his other alleged troubles, the
defense stated that Heidgen was in good shape financially as he
had just inherited $20,000, and that he had encouraged his
mother's marriage. 20 1
The defense provided testimony from
family and friends indicating that Heidgen had "never been
depressed in his life" and was in a "great mood" before leaving
the party a half hour before the crash. 20 6 The defense conceded
that his actions were criminal 2 7 but characterized them as "a
tragic, unfortunate accident with a 24-year-old trying to get
home."20 8 In reference to Heidgen, his attorney stated: "[Tihis
child is not a murderer to be held to the same standard and
punishment as someone who intentionally kills another in cold
blood .. ."209
The proceedings were as fraught with controversy as they
were with emotion.2" ' Ultimately, Heidgen was found guilty on

202

Warren Diepraam,

Eric Kugler & Marcia

Cunningham, Serious Facts

Require Serious Charges: Evolving Methods To Prosecute DWI Offenders Who Kill,
41 PROSECUTOR 34, 35-36 (Apr. 2007).
203 See Ann Givens, Their Final Seconds on Tape, NEWSDAY (Melville, N.Y.),
Oct. 4, 2006, at A6 [hereinafter Final Seconds]; Death Wish, supra note 187.
204 See Self-Destruct Mode, supra note 185.
20 Final Seconds, supra note 203.
206 Self-Destruct Mode, supra note 185; Death Wish, supra note 187.
207 See Ann Givens, Deadly Crash, but Was It Murder?, NEWSDAY (Melville,
N.Y.), Sept. 3, 2006, at A9 [hereinafter Deadly Crash];see also Final Seconds, supra
note 203.
200 Death Wish, supra note 187.
20' Deadly Crash, supra note 207.
210 There were many controversial
issues that arose during trial and
deliberations, such as the mid-trial admission of certain DNA evidence, mishandling
of evidence by police, sabotage attempts of a DNA test by the defendant, the decision
to allow the jurors to see the mangled remains of the vehicles outside the courtroom,
the decision to sequester the jury in the middle of deliberations, and alleged juror
misconduct of sharing inadmissible information. See Alcohol Test, supra note 196;
Ann Givens, Evidence Bungled?, NEWSDAY (Melville, N.Y.), Sept. 14, 2006, at A5;
Ann Givens, Jury Was Tainted: Lawyer, NEWSDAY (Melville, N.Y.), Dec. 1, 2006, at
A2; William Murphy & Stacey Altherr, Limo Crash Trial Judge Sequesters Jury; The

2008]

DEPRAVED INDIFFERNCEIN DWI HOMICIDES

1571

two counts of murder, three counts of first-degree assault, and
two counts of driving while intoxicated, and was acquitted on two
counts of reckless endangerment relating to the vehicles he
passed while on the parkway. 21 1 Nearly twenty months after the
accident, Heidgen received a sentence of eighteen years to life.212
2.

Analysis

Heidgen's conviction is currently being appealed in the
Appellate Division, Second Department,2 1 3 and issues such as
how Feingold applies to intoxication and when depraved
indifference murder is appropriate in the context of DWI
homicides will be ripe for discussion. The purpose of this section
will be to analyze the facts of this case and determine-in light of
the analysis set forth in Parts III.A, B, and C-whether this
conviction was justified.
If Heidgen was so intoxicated that he did not realize he was
on the wrong side of the parkway, a murder conviction cannot
stand.2 14 If Heidgen purposefully and deliberately drove his
truck towards oncoming traffic, a murder conviction is possible.
Driving a car towards oncoming traffic on a parkway is conduct
which carries with it a grave risk of death and is capable of
evincing a depraved state of mind. Even if the jury found this
conduct to be intentional, a murder conviction does not
automatically follow. It must then be established, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that Heidgen's extremely high level of

Move to Sequester: Is Judge Coercing Jury?, NEWSDAY (Melville, N.Y.), Oct. 17, 2006
at A5; Vulnerable, supra note 180.
211 Press Release, Nassau County Dist. Attorney, Heidgen Convicted of Murder
(Oct.
17,
2006),
available at http://www.nassaucountyny.gov/agencies/da/
newsreleases/2006/10-17-06.html [hereinafter Heidgen Convicted].
212 Denise M. Bonilla, The Limo Sentence, NEWSDAY (Melville, N.Y.), Mar. 1,
2007, at A5 [hereinafter Limo Sentence]; Press Release, Nassau County Dist.
Attorney,
Heidgen
Sentenced
18-Life
(Feb.
28, 2007),
available at
http://www.nassaucountyny.
gov/agencies/da/newsreleases/2007/02-28-07.html.
213 Interview with Jillian Harrington, Heidgen's Attorney on Appeal (Nov. 14,
2007) (on file with author). Ms. Harrington is a defense attorney in Manhattan, who
also drafted the defendant's brief in Feingold and argued the case before the Court of
Appeals of New York.
214 See supra Part III.B.2.b; see also Deadly Crash, supra note 207 ("They're
going to have to establish that there was a reason he was going the wrong way up
the Meadowbrook Parkway other than the fact that he was so drunk, he didn't know
he was going the wrong way ... " (quoting New York defense attorney Stephen
Scaring)).
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intoxication did not prevent him from assessing and recognizing
the risk involved. He must have been aware of the danger of his
conduct, aware of a high likelihood of death, and indifferent to it.
The facts of the case are like that of many DWI homicidespolice arrive on the scene only to find a terrible accident, fatally
injured victims, and a highly intoxicated offender.
Under
Feingold, how are we to determine the offender's state of mind?
Circumstantial evidence often only establishes that one party
was drinking, that he engaged in poor or reckless driving, and
that an accident occurred. Beyond intoxication, this evidence
does not take us into the offender's mind.
As discussed in more detail in Part IV, when there is proof of
intoxication, recent changes to New York's vehicular homicide
statutes create a presumption that intoxication is the cause of
the accident, and thus the death.21 5 If the prosecution wishes to
charge an offender with murder, however, the burden is on the
prosecution to produce evidence and to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt the mens rea of depraved indifference to human
life. In Heidgen's case, there were facts presented by both sides
that if true, could support either argument. Ultimately, the case
boiled down to a question of fact for the jury, and Heidgen was
convicted of second degree murder.2 16
3.

The Problem
Heidgen's conviction indicates that the factfinder believed
the prosecution and found there to be no reasonable doubt that
Heidgen drove on the wrong side of the parkway intentionally,
that he had full awareness of the risk and danger involved, and
that he was indifferent as to whether or not someone was killed.
In a case as publicized and emotionally charged as Hiedgen's,
however, such an objective and candid review of the facts does
not always occur. For families of victims, unmitigated contempt
for the defendant and the agony of a lost loved one make
anything but a murder conviction and a maximum sentence
inadequate.2 17 In the wake of such a horrific tragedy, these
21' This presumption applies to second degree vehicular manslaughter, first
degree vehicular manslaughter and aggravated vehicular homicide. See infra Part
IV.A.

216 Heidgen Convicted, supra note 211.
217 Alcohol Test, supra note 196 (quoting

Neil Flynn-Katie Flynn's Fathercalling Heidgen a "filthy child murderer," and a "gutless coward"); see also Limo
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scornful sentiments can extend to the media, the general public,
and dangerously, to jurors and prosecutors. Much of the success
in the prosecution of drunk driving fatalities can be attributed to
the "horrible facts" which typically accompany such cases.2 1
Innocent victims, gruesome crashes, and the sudden, unexpected
way in which these things happen are all part of the formula.
The result is a general public readiness to throw the book and
the dangerous possibility that a defendant's rights will "get lost
amid the emotional weight of a terrible crash."219
"[In the courtroom, murder is defined by more than just a
gruesome scene or a mother's agony."22 ° The Court of Appeals
has stated that depraved indifference murder "applies only to a
small, and finite, category of cases."221 In DWI homicides, as with
any other homicide, these rare cases must be promptly
222
distinguished from "the overwhelming majority of homicides"
that cannot support a charge of depraved indifference murder.2 23
Prosecutors make first contact with these cases and bear the
responsibility of deciding "whether there is a valid reason ...to
charge the defendant with murder rather than indicting him
under the usual intoxication manslaughter statutory scheme."2 24
Under a district attorney ("DA") like Kathleen Rice-the Nassau
County DA who was elected on an anti-drunk driving platformsuch a prudent review of the facts may not occur. 22' After the
Heidgen verdict, Rice stated: "If you get drunk and kill someone,
that's murder and you will be held accountable ... 226 Such a
Sentence, supra note 212 (quoting Neil Flynn expressing contempt for the entire
criminal justice system and calling the judge "a gutless coward" for not imposing a
maximum sentence); Ann Givens, No Verdict, No Going Home, NEWSDAY (Melville,
N.Y.), Oct. 17, 2006, at A5 ("Anything less than a murder conviction would be an
offense to my daughter's memory ... " (quoting Neil Flynn)); cf Limo Sentence,
supra note 212 (quoting Heidgen's father calling the sentence a "lynching").
218 Ann Givens, Legacy of the Heidgen Case, NEWSDAY (Melville, N.Y.), Oct. 22,
2006, at A24.
219

220
221

Id.

Deadly Crash, supra note 207.
People v. Suarez, 6 N.Y.3d 202, 207, 844 N.E.2d 721, 725, 811 N.Y.S.2d 267,

271 (2005).
222 People v. Payne, 3 N.Y.3d 266, 270, 819 N.E.2d 634, 635, 786 N.Y.S.2d 116,
117 (2004).
221 See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
224 Diepraam, Kugler & Cunningham, supra note 202, at 36.
225 See Fatal Limo, supra note 207; Paul Vitello, Alcohol, a Car and a Fatality.
Is It Murder?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2006, § 4, at 1.
226 Ann Givens, Jury Speaks: It's Murder, NEWSDAY (Melville, N.Y.), Oct. 18,
2006, at A3; see also Vitello, supra note 225 (" 'We hope that this verdict sends a
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blanket statement of law is not only legally incorrect, but makes
it seem as though prosecutors are prepared to charge murder in
DWI homicides with little or no consideration of whether the
defendant was actually depraved. The possibility of scoring a big
conviction and strengthening a hard-on-drunk driving image may
make the temptation to do so "legally and strategically
irresistible."22' 7 If this is the case, one step forward for drunk
driving will come at the cost of two steps backward in
proportionate punishment.
If a murder charge is brought in a case where it is not
warranted, it is the responsibility of the jury to find the
defendant innocent of murder and convict him of the appropriate
crime. This is precisely its purpose. In the emotionally charged
environment of a DWI fatality, however, this purpose may not be
realized. This can be due to a simple misunderstanding of the
law22 8 or a more conscious reverse form of jury nullification. 229 In
Heidgen's case, the jury's job was to look at the facts and
determine Heidgen's state of mind. Nevertheless, one juror
explained that during deliberations, "[tihere was so much
emphasis being put on the little girl and how tragic it was."23 °
The facts of the case were horrific: Police officers testified how
Jennifer Flynn held her daughter's head in her arms moments
after the accident, 231thjurors saw the chilling crash video taken
from the dashboard camera of the limo three times during

message that if you drink and drive and kill somebody[,] you will be prosecuted for
murder,' [Rice] said.").
227 People v. Roe, 74 N.Y.2d 20, 35, 542 N.E.2d 610, 619, 544 N.Y.S.2d 297, 306
(Bellacosa, J., dissenting) (1989).
22' The court in Suarez cited juror confusion as one of the reasons why, in twincount indictments, "juries ...convict [a charge of murder] even though the evidence
did not support it." People v. Suarez, 6 N.Y.3d 202, 207, 844 N.E.2d 721, 725, 811
N.Y.S.2d 267, 271 (2005).
229 Typically, jury nullification refers to an acquittal by a jury despite the fact
that the elements of an offense have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The
jurors feel compassion for the accused, ignore the law and judge's instructions, and
consciously acquit despite the fact that legally, a conviction is proper. JOSHUA
DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 18 (4th ed. 2007). In cases of

DWI homicide, the sentiment is very much the opposite-jurors feel compassion for
the victims, contempt for the offender, and may convict a defendant of murder when
the facts only support a lesser crime. See infra note 234 and accompanying text.
230 Zachary R. Dowdy & Jennifer Smith, How 12 Angry People Decided,
NEWSDAY (Melville, N.Y.), Oct. 18, 2006, at A2.
231 Deadly Drive, supra note 195.
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trial,28 2 and jurors were taken into the parking lot of the
courthouse to look at the mangled remains of both vehicles
involved. Given the extreme nature of the case and of the
testimony, it is likely that emotion played a large part in the
jury's decision. Whether these emotions convicted a reckless
man of murder or were simply an added element in a case of true
depravity is unknown, and will surely be a topic of discussion on
appeal.
Even if a conviction is unjustified-brought by zealous
prosecutors and convicted by confused or angry jurors-it is
unlikely to elicit any backlash from the general public. The
majority of citizens have virtually no conception of what
depraved indifference murder is 233 and, as one would expect,
there is little public concern about defending the rights of drunk
drivers-especially those who cause a death.
"[Pleople
instinctively want to see the drunken driver charged with
murder .... There's such public outrage, the public just wants
to fry the person ....
But that doesn't always mean that it was
2 34

murder."

4.

The Solution
In those cases where prosecutors, jurors, and the general
public consult their passions and personal beliefs over the law,
the courts themselves are the last hope and most important line
of defense against an unjust murder conviction. It is the duty of
the court to ensure that a charge of depraved indifference murder
only goes to a jury in those cases where there is sufficient
evidence supporting it. To allow DWI homicides to go to jury on
232 The video was presented at trial once before the prosecution rested, Final
Seconds, supra note 203, and twice during closing statements. Ann Givens, But Is It
Murder?, NEWSDAY (Melville, N.Y.), Oct. 11, 2006, at A05. The video is online at
http://www.newsday.com/news/locallongisland/ny-limovideo-main,0,5874567.html
story?coll=ny-top-headlines.
233 A simple Internet search and perusal of various blogs discussing the Heidgen
case reveal bloggers and commenters attempting to discuss theoretical issues and
use legal terms with very little understanding of the various offenses or the
relationship between them. This point is important because juries are simply a
cross-section of the general public. Although they are instructed on the law, it would
be credulous to believe that twelve people can understand the doctrine of depraved
murder and apply it in a vacuum after receiving one jury charge when for the last
150 years, judges, attorneys, and others well-versed in the law have struggled to do
So.
234 Deadly Crash, supra note 207 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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flimsy evidence or highly speculative theories puts defendants at
the mercy of a jury's atfections in the aftermath of a horrible
tragedy. In Heidgen, there was a question of fact as to whether
Heidgen was merely drunk or both drunk and suicidal. There
appeared to be, however, little evidence that he was in fact
suicidal. Made from a hospital bed only hours after a terrible car
accident, the phrase "self-destruct mode" could have meant a
number of things. The prosecution paired this statement with
some possible sources of unhappiness in Hiedgen's life and ran
with a theory of suicide. Jillian Harrington, Heidgen's attorney
on appeal, stated that while "there may be a factual scenario
where [a murder charge in a DWI homicide] would be
appropriate, [Heidgen's case] certainly does not present that type
of factual scenario ....
Simply stated, you need something more
to establish depraved indifference to human life and that
235
something more just is not present here."
In light of all the evidence, judges must determine whether
an actual question of fact exists, or whether prosecutors create
questions in an otherwise straightforward case of drinking and
driving. The Feingold standard is a stringent one. There is no
such thing as constructive depravity. The analysis is wholly
subjective. The mental state is actual. If the prosecution cannot
meet this high burden, the defendant does not get off scot-free; he
is still charged with a felony and may still serve as many as
twenty-five years in prison. To charge a man with the highest
grade felony that exists in our penal system and hold him as
accountable as an intentional murderer should carry a high
burden. If the evidence is not strong enough to indicate that a
legitimate question of fact exists, it is the duty of the court to
preclude a murder charge from being brought in order to protect
defendants from unjust and disproportionate convictions.
IV. How To DEAL WITH DWI HOMICIDES IN NEW YORK
With 11,146,368 licensed drivers2 36 and 10,551,341 registered
vehicles,23 7 New York is fourth among states in terms of number

235 Interview with Jillian Harrington, Heidgen's Attorney on Appeal (Nov. 14,
2007) (on file with author).
236 New York State Department of Motor Vehicles, NYS DMV-Statistics-NYS
Driver Licenses on File-2006, http://www.nydmv.state.ny.us/Statistics/statli06.htm
(last visited Sept. 21, 2008).
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of drivers.23 8 According to the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, in 2006-the most recent available data-there
were 1,454 traffic fatalities in New York, 483 (33 percent) of
which involved drivers who had consumed alcohol.2 39 New York
was the first state in the United States to adopt laws specifically
addressing the issue of drunk driving 240 and continues to legislate
in an effort to combat it. In 1981, the state adopted a series of
very successful STOP-DW1241 reforms increasing punishment for
DWI offenders, allowing counties to create their own unique
programs for highway and alcohol safety, and at the same time,
raising revenue and saving tax dollars. In 2002, New York
abandoned its .10% BAC standard, and adopted the stricter
federal standard of .08% BAC as the per se illegal level for
intoxication. 242 The most significant changes in New York law
pertaining to DWI homicides have occurred over the last three
years. These changes vastly improve the way in which DWI
homicides are categorized and punished and have implications
for the use of depraved indifference murder in these types of
cases.
A.

Statutory Changes: 2005-2007

On October 22, 2004, Vasean Alleyne, 11, and Angel Reyes,
12, were crossing the street not far from their homes in Queens,

237 New York State Department of Motor Vehicles,

NYS DMV-Statistics-

Vehicle Registrations in Force-2006, http://www.nydmv.state.ny.us/Statistics/
regin06.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2008).
238Federal
Highway
Administration,
United
States Department
of
Transportation, Driver Licensing-Highway Statistics-2005, http://www.fhwa.
dot.gov/policy/ohim/hs05/pdf/dl22.pdf (last visited July 29, 2008). New York is
exceeded only by California, Texas, and Florida. Id.
239 NHTSA's NAT'L CTR. FOR STATISTICS & ANALYSIS, TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS
2006
DATA:
ALCOHOL-IMPAIRED
DRMNG,
available
at
http://wwwnrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/810801.pdf (including all drivers with a BAC greater than
.01g). But see getMADD.com, http://www.getmadd.com/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2008)
(questioning the accuracy of these statistics).
240America's Directory of Qualified DUI Attorneys, History of California DUI
Laws, http://www.dui.com/dui-library/california/related/dui-legislation (last visited
Sept. 21, 2008).
241See supra note 112; see also N.Y. Bill Jacket, 2006 S.B. 8232, ch. 732
("Between 1980/1981, the last time comprehensive reform was enacted, and 1996,
the likelihood of being involved in a crash with a drunk driver was reduced by
69%[.1").
242See Act of Dec. 23, 2002, Assembly Bill No. 8429, 2002 N.Y. Consol. Laws
Adv. Legis. Serv. ch. 3, at 2 (LexisNexis).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

1578

[Vol. 82:1537

New York.24 3 The two stepped out from between two parked cars
when John Wirta, 56, who was driving with a .13% BAC, struck
them with his van. Vasean died as a result of the accident and
Angel survived after a week-long coma.244 At that time, it was
well-settled in New York that "[p]roof of intoxication alone [was]
not enough to sustain a conviction of criminal negligence." 24 5 The

burden was on the prosecution to establish that "the defendant's
intoxication affected his physical and mental capacity to the
extent that it caused him to operate his vehicle in a culpably
reckless manner."246 After a four-month investigation, there
appeared to be no evidence that Wirta had broken any traffic
laws or engaged in any kind of reckless driving. Because
criminal negligence was an element of vehicular manslaughter,
Wirta could be charged only with the misdemeanor DWI. He
served thirty-eight days of a sixty-day sentence, received a
$1,000 fine, and had his license suspended for six months.24 v
As the result of lobbying by Vasean's mother and recognition
by the state legislature that cases like this present a problem,
Vasean's Law was passed.24 This bill rewrote vehicular homicide
in New York and set the stage for a series of statutory changes
that would have a significant effect on the prosecution of DWI
homicides. 24 9 Effective June 8, 2005, Vasean's Law removed the

243 Corey Kilgannon, Driver Avoids a Felony Charge in Boy's Death, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 12, 2005, at B3.
244

Id.

People v. Bast, 19 N.Y.2d 813, 815, 227 N.E.2d 47, 47, 280 N.Y.S.2d 149, 150
(1967). This became known as the "rule of two," because it required something
in addition to DWI alone. See Press Release, N.Y.S. Senate, Senate Passes
"Vasean's Law" (May 4, 2005), http'//www.senate.state.ny.us/pressreleases.
nsf/a9c64cb05dda7e7e85256aff006d42c0/20152eclb2a50e5685256ff7005cla40?Open
Document.
246 Bast, 19 N.Y.2d at 815, 227 N.E.2d at 47, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 150; see also
People v. Phippen, 232 A.D.2d 790, 791, 649 N.Y.S.2d 191, 192 (3d Dep't 1996)
(calling causation "an essential element which the People must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt" and noting that a mere "probable connection" between
intoxication and death requires an acquittal (quoting People v. Stewart, 40 N.Y.2d
692, 697, 358 N.E.2d 487, 491, 389 N.Y.S.2d 804, 807 (1976))).
247 Scott Shifrel, Vasean's Killer to Get License, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 11, 2006,
at 21; Statement by Queens District Attorney Richard A. Brown, June 23, 2005,
available at http://queensda.org/ (follow "Press Releases" hyperlink to June 23,
2005).
248 N.Y. Bill Jacket, 2005 A.B. 6285, ch. 39 (2005).
2" Historical and Statutory Notes to N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.12-125.13
(McKinney 2008); Press Release, N.Y. State Senate, Senate Passes "Vasean's Law,"
245
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element of criminal negligence from first degree vehicular
manslaughter2 5 0 and second degree vehicular manslaughter,2 5 1
and created a rebuttable presumption of causation between
intoxication and death:
If it is established that the person operating such motor
vehicle.., caused such death while unlawfully intoxicated or
impaired by the use of alcohol or a drug, then there shall be a
rebuttable presumption that, as a result of such intoxication or
impairment... such person operated the motor vehicle.., in a
manner that caused such death .... 252
If a person has a BAC of .08% or more-is per se intoxicatedand causes the death of another person while driving, there is a
rebuttable presumption that the person's intoxication was the
cause of the death. This presumption removes any form of mens
rea from the vehicular manslaughter statutes and requires
prosecutors to prove only (1) that the defendant was intoxicated,
and (2) that a death occurred.
While this lowered the standard of proof, it did not remove
the requirement of causation. In those cases where intoxication
and death occur coincidentally, the offense is not satisfied.2 5 3 The
best example of this is drunk driver A who is stopped at a red
light and is hit from behind by driver B. If B dies, it cannot be
said that A's intoxication was the cause of his death. Similarly,
in a case like Vasean's, if a jury found that even a sober driver
would have been unable to avoid the children and that the
driver's intoxication was not the reason for the accident, the
presumption should not be applied. The rebuttable nature of the
presumption allows defendants to present evidence establishing
that the causal link between intoxication and death was not
present. Nevertheless, the presumption is permissive and so a
jury is free to apply it or not apply it as it deems appropriate,
regardless of whether the defendant presents any evidence. 5 4

(May 4, 2005), http://www.senate.state.ny.us/pressreleases.nsfla9c64cb05dda7e7e
85256aff006d42c0/20152eclb2a50e5685256ff7005cla40?OpenDocument.
250 N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.13(5).
251 Id. § 125.12(3).
252 Id.; Id. § 125.13(5).
253 The offense requires that the death of the victim occur "as a result
of... intoxication or impairment." Id. § 125.12(1).
254 People v. Baker, 14 Misc. 3d 629, 631, 826 N.Y.S.2d 550, 552 (Essex County
Ct. 2006), affd, 51 A.D.3d 1047, 856 N.Y.S.2d 707 (3d Dep't 2008). The jury
instructions for vehicular manslaughter clearly state that the members of the jury
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In 2006, the legislature continued its quest to "minimiz[e]
he carnage" of drunk driving in New York and respond to a
resurgence of DWI fatalities by enacting another comprehensive
reform of the state's drunk driving laws.2 5 Among the changes
was the addition of four new aggravating factors to the crime of
vehicular manslaughter in the first degree.2 56
Before this
enactment, the grade D felony of second degree vehicular
manslaughter
was elevated to first degree vehicular
manslaughter only when the offender's driver's license had been
revoked or suspended as a result of a prior DWI conviction or a
refusal to submit to a chemical test.257 The 2006 changes added
four more aggravating factors including: (1) a BAC of 0.18% or
more, (2) a previous DWI conviction in the last ten years,
(3) causing the death of more than one person, and (4) a previous
vehicular manslaughter or vehicular assault conviction.25 8 These
changes made it easier for a charge of second degree vehicular
manslaughter to be elevated to the more culpable and more
seriously punished grade C felony of first degree vehicular
manslaughter.
In 2007, yet another bill was passed continuing the trend of
decreased tolerance, increased deterrence,
and harsher
punishment for drunk drivers in New York. The effect of this
legislation was to create the grade B felony of aggravated
vehicular homicide, 259 an offense one grade higher than first
degree vehicular manslaughter. Aggravated vehicular homicide
is most easily defined as first degree vehicular manslaughter
plus reckless driving.2 6 °
"may, but are not required to" apply the presumption. Id. at 631, 826 N.Y.S.2d at

552.
255

N.Y. Bill Jacket, 2006 S.B. 8232, ch. 732 (2006) ("[Bletween 1996 and 2000,

the likelihood of being involved in a crash with a drunk driver increased by 21%
while arrests and convictions have dropped by over 20%. And that trend has
continued unabated over the past five years.").
256

Id.

258

Historical and Statutory Notes to N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.13.
Id. § 125.13(1), (3)-(5).

259

Id. § 125.14.

260

See N.Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW § 1212 (McKinney 2008).

257

Reckless driving shall mean driving or using any motor vehicle, motorcycle
or any other vehicle propelled by any power other than muscular power or
any appliance or accessory thereof in a manner which unreasonably
interferes with the free and proper use of the public highway, or
unreasonably endangers users of the public highway.
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The Big Picture

The result of these changes is a comprehensive and effective
scheme for the punishment and deterrence of DWI homicides.
Six offenses on five different levels of culpability address an
essentially infinite number of ways in which drinking and
driving can result in death. For the most part, the offenses build
on one another, with aggravating factors contributing an added
degree of culpability, justifying higher classification and
warranting greater punishment. Please refer to appendix B for a
visual representation of what is explained below.
Second degree vehicular manslaughter, first degree
vehicular manslaughter, and aggravated vehicular homicide all
contain the presumption of Vasean's law and carry a very low
standard of proof for prosecutors. These three statutes apply in
cases where a death has occurred and the defendant's BAC has
met the per se illegal level of .08%. In the majority of these
cases, the statutes are almost self-working. The presence of a
death and a .08% BAC are all that is needed for a charge of the
grade D felony of second degree vehicular manslaughter. In
order to rise to the grade C felony of first degree vehicular
manslaughter, one of the five aggravating factors of NYPL
section 125.13 must be met. 261 These factors are pure questions
of fact that are either present or not and subject to little debate
in court. The grade B felony of aggravated vehicular homicide
requires the presence of one of these five factors or a sixth factor
of causing the death of one person and the serious physical injury
of another.26 2 It also requires reckless driving.2 63 These three
offenses neatly administer three different levels of punishment
for three levels of culpability in DWI fatalities.
Despite this neat and clear arrangement of vehicular
offenses, prosecutors are sure to seek the grade C felony of
second degree manslaughter in those cases that do not meet one
of the aggravating factors of first degree vehicular manslaughter
when there is evidence that the defendant was reckless.
Recklessness must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and if
the defendant truly possessed such a mens rea, a charge of
second degree manslaughter would not be theoretically
261 See supra notes 257-258 and accompanying text.
262
263

See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.14.
See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
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inappropriate or unjust. Nevertheless, the optimistic defense
attorney would argue:
[I]n light of the 2005, 2006 and 2007 changes to the Vehicular
Manslaughter statutes, it appears that there is little reason to
resort to a charge of Manslaughter 2nd in a DWI case....
... [Tihe Legislature has clearly and expressly defined the
situations in which264it wants a vehicular homicide to be treated
as a class C felony.
Theoretically this makes good sense, but if a charge of second
degree manslaughter is plausible and advantageous to the
prosecution it is sure to be brought.
Now for the high and low ends of the spectrum. In those
cases where a defendant has a BAC lower than .08%, or where
the Vasean presumption has been rebutted, a charge of second
degree vehicular manslaughter cannot stand. If the prosecution
can establish criminal negligence, the grade E felony of
criminally negligent homicide can be brought. This would bring
the analysis back to the pre-Vasean "rule of two,"2 6 requiring a
showing of something in addition to mere intoxication in order to
establish the "gross deviation from the standard of care that a
reasonable person would observe."2 66 On the high end, in those
rare and extreme cases falling within Category 2,267 a charge of
second-degree murder may be brought.
C.

Implicationsfor Depraved Indifference Murder
The new framework for the prosecution of DWI homicides
discussed in Part IV.B has significant implications in a
discussion of depraved indifference murder.
Aggravated
vehicular homicide filled what used to be a substantial gap
between the grade C felonies of first degree vehicular
manslaughter or second degree manslaughter and depraved
indifference murder. In cases such as Heidgen's, where the
conduct is extreme and the resulting violence great, a grade C
felony carrying a maximum sentence of fifteen years fails to
quench the retributive thirst of a society plagued by DWI
tragedy. Where the conduct is extreme, but not depraved,
264

PETER GERSTENZANG & ERIc H. SILLS, HANDLING THE

YORK § 12.16, at 226 (2007-2008 ed. 2007).
265 See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
266 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05(4).
267 See supra Part III.C.
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means
of
aggravated
vehicular
homicide
provides a
distinguishing a case from the less culpable grade C felony. It
builds on the lower offense by requiring the additional culpable
element of reckless driving, thereby justifying greater
punishment. Aggravated vehicular homicide is a clear legislative
proclamation that reckless driving, with the presence of
intoxication and an aggravating factor constitutes a grade B
felony. In the past, this has been the recipe for a murder
conviction. 68 In light of the creation of aggravated vehicular
homicide and the court's decision in Feingold, it is fairly clear
that a charge of murder now requires something moresomething rarely seen in DWI homicides.
The three vehicular statutes are the ideal and most efficient
way to deal with DWI homicides. They describe specific DWI
conduct and establish what kind of drunk driving is to constitute
a grade B, C, or D felony. There is no intoxication-mens rea
debacle, and Vasean's law allows juries to appropriately infer
causation in the majority of cases. The fact that these statutes
are specifically engineered to handle DWI cases makes for a
simple, yet precise application of law, proportionate punishment
for offenders, and sends a clear message to the public regarding
the legislature's view on DWI killings. The same cannot be said
for depraved indifference murder. Murder prosecutions in DWI
cases are a backdoor way to punish conduct that is otherwise
legislated directly. If the legislature wanted punishment beyond
the grade B felony of aggravated vehicular homicide, it likely
would have created an offense of vehicular murder or an
equivalent, describing those DWI offenses that should be
punished as A-I felonies. Given the nature of DWI offenses and
the adequacy of the current scheme in addressing them, this does
not appear to be necessary.
The homicide offenses listed in appendix B and discussed in
Part IV.B punish results-the death of a human being. By
nature, the punishment of results is more a matter of retributive
justice than of deterrence. As we have discussed, the possibility
of death rarely enters the calculation of a drunk driver on a
serious level, and so the deterrent effect of DWI homicide
legislation is questionable. If deterrence is the goal, the conduct
should be punished directly. Increased penalties for DWI itself
28 See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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are likely to have a greater effect on decision-making than
iicreabed punishment for those DWis resulting in death.2 69
Whatever the future holds for depraved indifference murder and
DWI legislation, the legal community must continue to adapt the
law in order to achieve societal goals and apply it narrowly in the
interest of proportionate punishment.
CONCLUSION

New York homicide law addresses the full spectrum of
human culpability and categorizes offenses in an effort to
administer punishment that is proportionate to the culpability
involved. Depraved indifference murder is an offense created for
those unintentional killings so heinous, so wanton, and so
immoral that they should be punished as if they were
intentional. Classic examples of such conduct include shooting a
gun wildly in a crowded barroom or placing a time bomb in a
busy public space---conduct that is not intended to kill anyone
specifically, but performed with a full awareness that someone is
likely to be killed. Over the years, prosecutors have brought
charges of depraved indifference murder in those DWI homicides
where punishment beyond vehicular manslaughter or reckless
manslaughter was desired. While these cases may present
horrific facts or elicit public outrage, the overwhelming majority
of DWI homicides do not fit the murder prescription. This is due
to the nature of the conduct, the risk involved, and the mental
state of the offender. The current scheme of New York homicide
offenses provides an adequate means of defining, classifying, and
punishing deaths caused by drunk driving and eliminates the
need to force a charge of depraved indifference murder in DWI
homicides where it does not belong.

269 See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
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